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INTRODUCTION 
ational armed forces and international military institutions face volatile 
missions, diverse tasks, and ever-changing complex, multilevel operational 
environments. In this sense, change is the only constant. However, the 
instructional function of military organizations is also a constant. Individuals already 
in service adapt to and actively adapt their thinking and skills when sudden shifts in 
context and given tasks demand this; such is the nature of the military profession. 
However, both serving members and new recruits in all phases of their careers 
undergo organized military education and training.  
Traditionally, military education is understood to provide military professionals with 
the necessary skills, certain mental models, and operating procedures that professional 
training, and on-the-job learning reinforce. Understood more specifically, a military 
professional is seen as a carrier of previous work history and experiences, professional 
knowledge, competencies and commitments, and these are connected to how 
professional agency is acted out. Hence, professional knowing is treated as an 
individual process. It is related to personal experience as well as the acquisition of 
disciplinary competences resulting in an understanding of what, how and why things 
are done (Boud & Hager, 2012). In sum, this reflects the perception of learning as the 
individual acquisition of knowledge and skills. 
Although values and key skills are important, professional learning also involves 
participation in both teaching/learning and work practices. In a theoretical sense, 
practices are sequences of human activities that consist of several interconnected 
elements such as forms of mental activities, objects and their use, know-how, 
materials and emotions (Reckwitz, 2002). Practices rely on relations in which 
heterogeneous combinations of different entities are brought into existence. 
Participating in practices is an ongoing process, and involves a notion of becoming 
professional. Thus participation produces knowledge, knowers and the known 
(Fenwick, 2014). This also orients discussion on learning from skills acquisition 
towards what happens in these relations and why, or rather towards actions within 
these practices and the kind of knowledge they give rise to. 
It follows that the focus is then on the everyday activities of education and learning. 
This pays attention to the dynamics of everyday actions as well as teaching and 
learning practices: how practices are organized, produced, reinforced or changed, and 
the kind of information or know-how that is inherent in these practices (cf. Feldman 
& Orlikowski, 2011). These practices shed light on how things become processualized 
and organized, and the actions also highlight what is significant. Hence, action 
generates information and influences our knowing (Fenwick, 2012: 5; Gherardi, 
2014). 
The viewpoint chosen in this anthology is the examination of practices and processes 
in military education and training that have not received sufficient attention in the 
scientific military debate. In this respect, the focus is on everyday activities that 
produce significant professional knowledge for military students and personnel both 
intentionally and/or otherwise. These activities bring into focus habitual practices, 
N 
  
2 
and disturbances that open up new opportunities or actions that preserve, transfer, or 
prevent knowledge that might have been possible to acquire. These actions and the 
knowledge they produce are further understood as a resource that can be incorporated 
into professional learning. 
Four scholars, writing from different points of view, have contributed to this 
anthology, and we believe that their contributions provide a rich and interesting 
picture of the landscape of varying military educational challenges in the 21st century. 
All of the chapters were peer reviewed, two by the editors of this anthology, while 
two underwent a double-blind peer review process in which the reviewers were 
academics with specific expertise in the given field, holding at least adjunct 
professorship in social or military sciences.  
Dr. Marenne Jansen (Radboud University & Netherlands Military Academy) examines 
in her chapter how the contradiction between standardization and uncertainty is 
experienced in the Dutch military. Her PhD research, on which this chapter was 
based, uses observations from fieldwork in the Dutch military and is framed within 
the theoretical perspective of dealing with uncertainty. Jansen’s chapter was peer 
reviewed, and accepted based on reviewers’ consideration of revisions. 
Jarrod Pendlebury is a PhD candidate at the University of Sydney and Sir Richard 
Williams Foundation Air Power Scholar whose research explores military identity 
construction and performance. He has more than 20 years of experience in the Royal 
Australian Air Force. In his chapter, he examines the construction of military identity 
in air force officer basic training in the framework of Bourdieu’s theory of social 
practice, utilizing focus group data from Royal Air Force College Cranwell, the United 
States Air Force Academy, and the Australian Defence Force.  
Thomas Crosbie (corresponding author of the respective chapter) is an Assistant 
Professor in the Institute for Military Operations at the Royal Danish Defence 
College. His research interests include military politics, military education and the 
sociology of private security. He is co-editor of The Sociology of Privatized Security 
(Palgrave Macmillan), and has published more than a dozen scholarly articles in 
journals including Joint Force Quarterly, Sociological Theory, and Armed Forces & Society. 
Co-author Edward R. Lucas is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Military 
and Strategic Studies at the United States Air Force Academy. He holds a PhD in 
International Relations from the American University and is a graduate of the Royal 
Military College of Canada. Prior to entering academia, he served for ten years in the 
Royal Canadian Navy. The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the US Air Force, the 
Department of Defense or that of the US Government. Nicolai Withander, Master 
of Political Science (MSc), is a research fellow at the Institute for Strategy at the Royal 
Danish Defence College. His research interests include defence policy, military 
education, military operations, asymmetrical warfare, and counterinsurgency (COIN).  
 
Crosbie and his co-authors examine a somewhat unexplored area of Professional 
Military Education (PME) in the context of the NATO military institute. To this end, 
they look at two institutions, the US Air Command and Staff College and the Royal 
Danish Defence College in order to discuss a new comparative approach to the study 
of global patterns in military education.  
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Ulla Anttila holds a PhD in military sciences from the National Defence University 
(Helsinki, Finland) and an MA from the University of Helsinki. Her doctoral thesis 
focused on crisis management and learning, and her post-doctoral work explores 
peacekeepers’ thinking as regards their homecoming and the subsequent change 
management. Anttila specifically examines both homecoming and change 
management after an international crisis management operation. The research 
reported in her chapter derives from data on three Finnish focus groups, which have 
experience of returning home after military crisis management operations. 
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2 
 
COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY: A DISCREPANCY IN MILITARY 
ORGANISATION?1  
Marenne Jansen 
Abstract 
ith military precision” is not simply just another expression or soundbite. 
It refers to probably the best-known characteristics of an army: its order, 
structure, and hierarchy. Yet, an equally applicable observation on 
military practice is its dynamic, complex environment. Both statements might be 
considered truisms, perhaps even a little cliché. Based on extensive fieldwork in the 
Dutch military itself, as well as theories on dealing with uncertainty, this article aims 
to investigate how the contradiction between standardisation and uncertainty is 
experienced in the Dutch military. From an ethnographic point of view, it is 
interesting to note that the rhetoric of the military and its personnel focuses on the 
complexities of military work—the importance of flexibility in unknown 
circumstances—whilst their daily routine mainly concentrates on processes of 
standardisation. Although the co-existence of processes of standardisation and an 
uncertain environment is not in itself problematic, it does include some pertinent risks 
for an organisation operating in insecure environments. In conclusion, the extent to 
which the existence of multiple military realities should be acknowledged in military 
education is questioned, because the challenge of preparing cadets for dual realities—
for complexity and uncertainty on the one hand, and well-ordered professionalism on 
the other—requires more than simply allowing them deal with the paradox.  
Keywords: complexity, uncertainty, organisational theory, military practice, military education 
2.1 Introduction 
War, civil unrest, and almost all conflict situations are by their very nature “messy” 
affairs, not only for the warring parties and the people caught up in them, but also for 
those reacting to such crises—not least, military personnel. As has become well-
established since the end of the Cold War, the global security landscape has changed 
drastically, and it is widely acknowledged that contemporary military and 
peacekeeping missions have become increasingly complex (Beebe & Kaldor, 2010; 
Chandler, 2012; Collier, 2003; Crocker, 2007; Frerks, 2007; Singer, 2009; Ul Haq, 
1995; UNDP, 1994). Notable works detailing these developments are Mary Kaldor’s 
(2007) famous intervention on the difference between “new” and “old” wars, or 
analyses of UN peacekeeping missions in the 1990s (Easterly, 2006; Meisler, 2007; 
Rubinstein, 2015; Schnabel, 2001; UNDP, 1994). More recent studies argue that 
“multilateral peace operations are increasingly confronting a set of interrelated and 
                                              
1 This chapter underwent a double-blind peer review process in which the two reviewers were 
academics with specific expertise in the given field. Manuscript was accepted based on editors’ and 
reviewers’ consideration of revisions. 
“W 
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mutually reinforcing security challenges that . . . have causes and effects which cut 
right across the international security, peacebuilding and development agendas” (van 
der Lijn, 2018, p. 1). Whilst Jair Van der Lijn focuses here on UN peacekeeping 
operations only, NATO (2018) acknowledges that “[t]oday, the Alliance is faced with 
a security environment that is more diverse, complex, fast moving and demanding 
than at any time since its inception,” (p. 1). Clearly, military practice is characterised 
by dynamic complexity—the unknown nature and uncertainty of the working 
environment.  
At the same time, military service is characterised by protocols, doctrines, and 
standardisation (Posen, 2016). Michele Chwastiak (2006) refers in this respect to “US 
war managers” (p. 51) and “cause-effect war” (p. 37), in order to describe the 
bureaucratic aspects of the Vietnam War. Some studies claim that there is “an 
increasingly obvious discrepancy between the high complexity and interdependence 
of conflict, and a comparably under-complex strategy and toolbox used to handle this 
complexity properly” (Ropers, Korppen, & Giessmann, 2011, p. 7).  
Both the military’s internal bureaucracy and the increasing complexity of the world in 
which it operates have been extensively discussed by scholars and practitioners alike. 
However, most studies focus either on the uncertainty of the complex environment 
of military practice, or concentrate solely on the bureaucratic characteristics of the 
military, which are characterised by processes of standardisation. The aim of this 
article is to investigate how this contradiction is experienced within the Dutch military 
and, in conclusion, to assess the consequences for military education.  
The article starts with a discussion of existing literature on uncertainty and 
standardisation in military practice. This analysis is used to define and situate clearly 
the above contradiction between complexity and standardisation. Subsequently, the 
process of data collection and analysis are discussed. The analysis, based on 
organisational theories on how to deal with uncertainty, suggests that whilst using a 
rhetoric of uncertainty, the military is still predominantly focused on standardisation. 
Finally, the article reflects upon the contradictions present in military practice, and 
the consequences for military education. Rather than intending to be conclusive, this 
article aims to serve as an invitation for further research into the implications of 
contradictory elements in military practice, and their consequences for military 
education.  
2.2 Methodological Design 
Data collection and analysis 
Data were collected during four years of field research from 2014 to 2018. During 
these four years, one observation consistently seemed of particular importance, 
namely, the tension between the standardisation of the work on the one hand, and 
the uncertainty and complexity of the working environment on the other. This  
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apparent contradiction became the starting point for this article. All interviews, which 
were recorded and transcribed, took place in the working environments of the 
participants. The interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. All participants were 
male and aged between 17 and 37. Participants were asked to describe their daily 
chores, talk about their military education, and reflect on their work. Participants were 
made aware that their stories would be processed anonymously and used for scientific 
research only. All participants gave oral consent. 
The data presented in this study are part of a PhD research that was designed based 
on the principles of informed grounded theory (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2015; Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Perry & Kempster, 2014). 2 Unlike classic grounded theory, informed 
grounded theory specifically encourages the use of pre-existing literature and theories 
as a means for both understanding the empirical material at hand, and supporting the 
analysis of the phenomena observed (Parry & Kempster, 2014, pp. 86–87; Thornberg, 
2012). 3 The analysis in this article is supported by a conceptual framework based on 
existing theories from Gareth Morgan (2006) and Karl Weick and Kathleen Sutcliffe 
(2007), both of which examine how organisations deal with uncertainty. This guiding 
framework helps to make sense of the collected data and to focus not only on the 
experiences of the Dutch servicemen themselves, but also on how their experiences 
are connected with underlying organisational mechanisms of the Dutch military, 
specifically with regard to organising uncertainty.  
Organising uncertainty 
Organisations have dealt with uncertainty in many different ways. Generally speaking, 
there are three fundamentally different perspectives in organisational theory 
concerned with dealing with uncertainty: classic organisation theory; an open system 
approach; and self-referential organisations (Morgan, 2006). The three perspectives 
are summarised in Table 1, which will serve as the guiding framework in the analysis 
and discussion, and is explained below.   
                                              
2 The PhD study focuses solely on male infantry officers. Until recently, infantry was a male-only 
service in the Dutch military. The study is divided into two parts. The first part is an ethnography of 
military education at the Netherlands Defence Academy (see Jansen & Kramer, 2018). The second 
part studies the operational context. Semi-structured interviews were held with 19 members of an 
infantry platoon in Afghanistan over a period of two weeks. This resulted in a case study on military 
leadership (see Jansen & Delahaij, 2019). Data regarding the domestic military environment were 
gathered via semi-structured interviews conducted with nine infantry officers over a period of six 
months. 
3 Grounded theory was developed by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967) as a method for 
conducting qualitative research, in reaction to the dominant tradition of positivist and deductive social 
research. Its central tenet is that research starts from data, rather than theory. “By adopting grounded 
theory methods you can direct, manage, and streamline your data collection and, moreover, construct 
an original analysis of your data” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 2). 
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Table 1: Organisational Design and Dealing with Uncertainty4 
 Reducing uncertainty by Internal organisational 
design for dealing with 
uncertainty 
Classic organisational 
theory 
creating and maintaining 
stability and predictability 
top-down design of control 
loops 
Open system approach “absolute” adaptation aimed at maximum 
variation and adaptability 
Self-referential 
organisations  
bounded or selective 
adaption  
aspects of design influence 
“self-organisation” 
 
Firstly, in classic organisational theory, the system is oriented towards internal 
stability. Organisations within this paradigm understand management as a “process 
of planning, organization, command, coordination and control” (Morgan, 2006, p. 
18). There will be defined lines of communication, mostly represented in “classic” 
organisational charts. Work is structured, and employees are understood as parts of 
the “machine.” The management of uncertainty is expected to come from “numerous 
control loops” (Moorkamp, 2017, p. 27) and “compliance to a prescribed code” 
(Blom, 1997, p. 14). Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) argue that in such organisations, 
“unexpected events can get them into trouble. When people form expectations, they 
assume that certain sequences of actions are likely to happen” (p. 41). Secondly, an 
open system approach stands in stark contrast to classic organisational theory. In this 
perspective, the environment is a given in which the organisation is an organism, 
rather than a machine (Morgan, 2006, pp. 11–64). Hence, the organisation will aim to 
adjust itself completely to its environment. Making changes within the system is not 
problematic for these organisations, as they will try to vary and adapt themselves to 
uncertainty. Thirdly, the perspective of self-referential organisations falls somewhere 
between the classic and the open approaches. These organisations are based on 
principles of selective adaptation (Blom, 1997). This perspective advocates a certain 
level of “closedness,” and generally, their organisational design both enables and 
restricts an organisation’s options to adapt to environmental demands (Blom, 1997). 
The question within this perspective is when to adapt, and when to stay put.  
2.3 Uncertainty and Standardisation in Theory 
The underlying premise for this article is that there is a contradiction between the 
uncertainty and chaos of war, and the military's preference for standardisation. This 
is not a new concern for armies – much military theory aims to devise means for 
overcoming the chaos by means of imposing routines on soldiers. Strategic theory 
from Von Clausewitz (1984) onwards considers the nature of the chaos. Military 
organisations must deal with high levels of uncertainty (Posen, 2016, p. 172). Some 
of this uncertainty stems from the international political environment (NATO, 2018; 
van der Lijn, 2018), whilst still more arises at an individual level: “The modern soldier 
is no longer simply a warrior: he (or she) is at once a peacekeeper, diplomat, leader, 
sibling and friend” (Beard, 2014, p. 274). Research by Wendy Broesder, Tessa op den 
                                              
4 Adapted from Moorkamp (2017, p. 30), based on studies from Blom (1997) and Morgan (2011, pp. 
11–26). 
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Buijs, Ad Vogelaar, and Martin Euwema (2015) confirms that soldiers struggle with 
these multiple identities. Additionally, soldiers are trained to handle confrontation—
large scale violations of human rights, political complexity, flagrant injustices, poverty, 
death and disease, (sexual) abuse, and an enemy who, most of the time, cannot be 
distinguished from the civilian population (Kaldor, 2007; Paris & Sisk, 2009). 
Significantly, the perpetrators of such conflicts do not behave according to the same 
rules as military personnel (de Graaff, Schut, Verweij, Vermetten, & Giebels, 2016).  
Furthermore, due to developments in (social) media, military operations and actions 
within these operations have become subject to extreme levels of scrutiny and 
exposure. Meanwhile, public and political opinion regarding military missions can 
change quickly. Instead of returning as a hero, the soldier might equally have become 
an example of national shame. The cases of Srebrenica (van Baarda & Verweij, 2006; 
Blocq, 2006) and Abu Ghraib (Giroux, 2004) are exemplary here. Whilst the 
complexities of operating in such conditions are widely acknowledged and might even 
be considered to have become largely taken for granted, simultaneously, the 
bureaucratic nature of the military is equally widely observed. The complexity of such 
situations contrasts starkly with the way in which military organisations are designed.  
Historically, a typical military organisational design is mechanical. Gareth Morgan 
(2006) traces the particular mechanistic world design back to the time of Frederick 
the Great (1712–1786), who “introduced many reforms that actually served to reduce 
his soldiers to automatons. . . . Frederick’s aim was to shape the army into an efficient 
mechanism operating through means of standardized parts” (p. 16). In a similar vein, 
in Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault (1977) argues that 
the ideal figure of the soldier . . . [in the seventeenth century] bore certain signs . . . 
By the late eighteenth century, the soldier has become something that can be made; 
out of a formless clay . . . the machine required can be constructed. (p. 135)  
In fact, Frederick the Great’s vision of a mechanised army gradually became the 
blueprint for modern society, as well as the operating basis for factories and offices. 
Referring to Max Weber’s “proliferation of bureaucratic forms,” David Graeber 
(2015) coined the term “total bureaucratization” in order to refer to the perverse logic 
of bureaucracy. He explains: “If you create a bureaucratic structure to deal with some 
problem, that structure will invariably end up creating other problems that seem as if 
they, too, can only be solved by bureaucratic means” (Graeber, 2015, pp. 149–150). 
Eric Hans Kramer (2007) elaborates: “When one cuts a process into pieces, one 
inevitably needs glue to put it together again. This glue can for example take the form 
of rules” (p. 119). This type of organisational design remains the blueprint for most 
military organisations (Posen, 2016; Soeters, Winslow, & Weibull, 2006).  
The observation of the contradiction between the widely acknowledged complexity 
of operating in crisis situations on the one hand, and the pervasiveness of the 
bureaucratic way in which the military is organised on the other, is in itself hardly 
groundbreaking. As Martin van Creveld (1985) argues, military organisations have 
struggled with this contradiction since Roman times, in the sense that large-scale 
military operations are seldom flexible in their scope. Military personnel often have 
to carry out tasks in a “dynamically complex environment” (Kramer, 2007, pp. 24–
27), whilst “the military has emerged as a prototype of the mechanistic organization” 
(Morgan, 2006, p. 16).   
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How servicemen and -women experience this contradiction in their daily work has 
not received much attention. This study aims to fill that gap. As Anders Sookermany 
(2017) explains, “[i]t is commonly accepted that the nature of military operations is 
one of such character that no matter how well you prepare, there will still be an 
expectation of having to deal with the unknown and unforeseen” (p. 310). The 
question is how this might be achieved.  
2.4 Uncertainty and Standardisation in Practice 
This section aims to illustrate the contradictory nature of the military environment by 
showing the two faces of military practice (uncertainty and standardisation), using 
excerpts from interviews with officers and cadets on how they experience life in the 
Dutch military. In order to give greater perspective on the individual experiences 
presented, further context is provided where necessary. The following presentation 
of the data starts with an introductory paragraph detailing the education received by 
military infantry officers at the Netherlands Defence Academy and concludes with a 
description of military practice.  
In the description of the military academy, two examples are given. One is a 
description of the first day of training for a new batch of infantry cadets; the second 
is an example of military education described as a mechanical process. In this second 
part on military practice, examples are given from the domestic and expeditionary 
environment. 
Military academy 
The official narrative of the Netherlands Defense Academy (NLDA) is that they 
“educate the leaders of the future” (Dalenberg, Folkerts, & Bijlsma, 2014, n.p.).5 The 
NLDA emphasises the importance of a broad education and academic knowledge for 
officers. They do not strive to teach precisely what to do when working as an officer, 
but rather aim “to build character” (Dalenberg et al., 2014, 38). This narrative 
emphasises both authenticity and complexity. Dutch military education is 
characterised by a hierarchal educational style, learning to take orders, and gaining 
knowledge of rules and procedures. Mechanistic structures in military education 
control how personnel dress, when they eat, when they engage in sporting activities, 
and when they work.  
The following notes, which I made on the day a new intake started their education, 
are rather characteristic: 
Still wearing civilian clothing, they have to stand in formation; in order of height, in 
four rows, an arm’s length apart, badge on the left. Because they all arrive at different 
moments, it takes a long time. Very long. I am told 80% of military life is waiting. 
They are patient, and expectant. After a while, they start marching. Their movements 
seem unfamiliar. They get their lunch packages. They still call it lunch package, soon 
it will be shortened to “lupa.” After lunch, a long lecture follows on their rights and 
obligations as servicemen. The lecture is filled with military jargon. I observe a certain 
                                              
 5 A detailed overview of life and study at this institute can be found in Dalenberg (2017); Groen and 
Klinkert (2003); Jansen and Kramer (2018). 
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schizoid character in these lectures. They are all about being authentic and pro-active, 
while the same PowerPoint presentation is used every semester. There is hardly time 
for questions, but most things are repeated at least twice. Whilst I am noting this all 
down, outside in the sun, the first newly formed platoon exits the building. “Group 
‘Bravo’ here,” they shout, and find their places in the formation quickly. (field notes, 
August 2015, Breda, the Netherlands) 
I am not the only one to have made these observations. Giuseppe Caforio (2006) 
argues that “procedures are used in order to induce strong normative compliance, 
such as community life, discipline, emphasized hierarchical order, rules for public and 
private behavior, and a system of sanctions” (pp. 255–256). In the context of the US 
military, Lieutenant Colonel Joe Doty and Major Walter Sowden (2009) describe how 
the army designs education in “a compartmentalized manner”: 
This is evident as you examine unit-training schedules. We refer to classes . . . as 
mandatory or chain teaching. To execute this training, . . . “canned” PowerPoint slide 
decks [are issued] . . . Once the training is complete, the “block” is checked and the 
unit moves on to the next task. (p. 70) 
In accordance with the above, most of the instructors I met in the Netherlands talked 
about the educational system as a set of neatly segmented processes, and are thus 
likely to show organograms and schematic PowerPoints, representing causal relations 
in learning processes.  
I now turn to the second example, namely, military education as a mechanical process. 
From the very start, the selection process is characterised by a duality between 
standardisation and apparent arbitrariness. Before being admitted to the academy, 
aspirant officers are interviewed and tested for their IQ, physical fitness, and 
psychological health. The primary instruments for selection are standardised tests, and 
a confidential form on which a number of the cadet’s key dispositions are divided into 
many boxes and predefined questions. However, despite these tested methods and 
instruments, the military psychologist who welcomed me to the selection center 
elaborated: “In fact, the AAC [Acceptance and Advice Commission] is the most 
important. They give binding advice whether to hire someone or not. And their 
process is a black box” (psychologist, personal communication, June 10, 2015). 
However, the AAC, which is chaired by a retired colonel, disagrees with the 
psychologist’s assertion, and told me that they function as a “machine bureaucracy” 
(Colonel, chair of the Acceptance and Advice Commission, personal communication, 
October 29, 2015). The metaphor used by the colonel is not unique: instructors and 
cadets alike often talk about themselves in metaphors such as “products” and 
“manufacturing.” As a further example, a course instructor (a sergeant) talks about 
his work in factory metaphors: “the military academy does not produce officers, but 
makes semi-manufactured products, the technical training is responsible for the next 
step in line” (field notes, November 2014, Breda, the Netherlands).  
Nevertheless, the “assembly line” is considered far from perfect by those responsible 
for “operating” it. Instructors at the Netherlands Defence Academy and the technical 
infantry training all share the feeling that they constantly have to “unlearn” that which 
was previously taught, either at high school, at university, or sometimes even at other 
military units: “We first have to unlearn whatever they did before, and we will teach 
them how it really works,” explains an instructor at the military academy (Captain, 
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personal communication, 2015). A major, responsible for the technical training of the 
cadets following their education at the Netherlands Defence Academy, explains:  
My biggest challenge is to break down the habits they learned at the military academy. 
What they have built up during those years in Breda has to be broken down. They 
will soon find themselves in a completely different world. (Major, personal 
communication, October 6, 2016) 
This “completely different world” has at least two contexts: the domestic and the 
expeditionary military environments. In the following section, I give a few examples 
from the Afghanistan case study and from interviews conducted with infantry officers 
in the Netherlands, in order to illustrate the comparable dynamics in the military 
practice. 
Military practice  
Domestic 
Although soldiers are best known for the role they play in military conflicts, they 
spend most of their time in peacetime, domestic settings—the nature of any military 
task being fundamentally different from the situation “at home” (Posen, 2016). The 
priority in domestic operational military units is to be well-trained and prepared, in 
case the need arises for the battalion to be sent on a mission. Hence, much energy is 
invested in getting soldiers to the required level of proficiency. An important aspect 
of the domestic situation is therefore the pre-deployment phase.  
This study draws upon the experiences of one platoon, preparing to go on a mission 
to Afghanistan. The platoon’s assignment will be to transport political advisors safely 
from their compound to other locations within the country. When a platoon is tasked 
to go on a mission, they need to do additional, mission-specific training. For some 
individuals, this means obtaining a specific driving licence for a vehicle that is used at 
the designated location, for others it means learning how to use different kinds of 
weaponry, whilst a third might need to update their technical knowledge. Hence, most 
platoon members follow training courses spread across various locations and time 
periods. Furthermore, they all need to have their dental controls and vaccinations in 
order, which also need to be fitted in at different moments in time because of the 
various training courses. Finally, most commanders want to give soldiers the 
opportunity to spend some time with their families and friends before they leave. In 
view of these multifarious demands on their schedules, little time is left to prepare for 
their actual mission—in practice, only a couple of days. I was invited to accompany 
them to one of their training locations. A former camping site was militarised, and 
empty holiday houses functioned as an Afghan village. Here, they practiced how to 
get those under their protection in and out of the military vehicles, how to safety-
check a location, and how to drive from A to B. “As they will drive the same roads 
for four months, the platoon is trained to stay alert when things become repetitive. 
This training is to prepare them” (Lieutenant, field notes, October 15, 2014).  
Besides pre-deployment training, there are the regular activities. Most trainee officers 
believe that most of their time will be spent literally “in the woods,” enduring mental 
and physical hardship, and always being ready to fight an enemy. In reality, however, 
these so-called “green moments” are scarce. The reality for junior officers is often 
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different, including a significant amount of administration: “There is always someone 
sick, becoming a parent, off for study leave, or a planning needs to be made. ‘Running 
around in the woods’ is no daily business at all” (Infantry Officer, personal 
communication, January 7, 2015). This difference between the ideal of spending time 
with their men in the woods, and the daily reality of spending time behind their desks, 
is just one example of the two faces of military reality.  
In order to support its officers with their planning, the Dutch military makes use of 
an integrated information system. However, most operational officers are not very 
enthusiastic about these information systems and planning tools. They are considered 
labour intensive and, according to one battalion commander, take up too much of 
their time: “There are too many rules, and the young lieutenants stick to them fiercely. 
They put rules above the privates. While you should actually be able to understand 
the privates’ position” (Lieutenant Colonel, personal communication, August 10, 
2015). A colonel describes how he sees the work of junior officers:  
The “regulatory frenzy” does not give them [junior officers] any exit option. You 
have to lie to comply with all the rules, rules that you can never comply with. For 
example, the number of obliged trainings simply does not fit in a year. You might be 
able to achieve the desired level [of professionalism of your platoon], and if you have 
managed that, you just tick some boxes, and make sure you are covered on paper. 
(Colonel, personal communication, August 18, 2015) 
These officers reveal a “sore point” of military practice, namely, that for those 
working in such a bureaucratic environment, there is a real risk of failing to connect, 
either to the people or to the environment around them, becoming fixated on 
compliance with the rules instead. 
Expeditionary  
In order to learn about the expeditionary environment, in January 2016, I visited the 
Dutch part of a military base in Afghanistan. For Dutch troops in Afghanistan, 2016 
was considered relatively calm, compared to 2007–2008, when troops often 
experienced combat. When I arrived, soldiers complained that they had nothing to 
do, and that they were bored of playing poker and going to the gym. The following 
excerpt describes my first hours spent in the camp:  
The container is locked. Whilst waiting for someone to open it, comments are made 
about the lack of “bitterballen,” a typical Dutch fried snack. It is 7 o’clock in the 
morning, and I just got off the plane that took me to Afghanistan. The last thing I 
would want right now is a fried snack. It is also the last topic I expected to discuss in 
a country where “we” are fighting a war. Interestingly enough, it is not a joke—it is 
a serious complaint. I am told they are “the forgotten mission,” [and] they have to 
ration these products, whilst in Mali, there is plenty of everything. Inside the 
container there are small offices on both sides, and one briefing room. This will 
become my office, but right now I am given a safety briefing, and several maps and 
instructions on what to do in case of an attack are handed to me. Things that seem 
rather arbitrary to me are explained in great detail, and supported by an extremely 
well-structured PowerPoint presentation. What I actually need to do, or where to go 
“when the shit hits the fan,” is quickly summed up afterwards. For now, I decide to 
trust in the assessment that this place is rather safe right now. (field notes, January 
2016, Afghanistan) 
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What I observed here was that in the face of actual uncertainty, procedures were relied 
upon to “take care of it”, whereas when things of less importance (for example, fried 
snacks) were concerned, there was plenty of time for discussion. In a way, this can be 
interpreted as a strategy by which to ignore uncertainty, covering it up with 
procedures. Another remarkable observation was that the majority of the roughly 60 
Dutch personnel working at the military base never left the compound: 
“Camp tigers,” they are called by the ones who do leave. They have breakfast at 07:15, 
lunch at 12:00, and dinner at 17:30, every day at the same long table, in the same 
dining hall, where other nationalities (Germans, Croats, and Americans) all have their 
own undesignated, but apparently agreed upon, tables. Television screens on the wall. 
Jokes about the lousy food. The same type of jokes that are made in the Netherlands. 
The dining hall, like the rest of the compound, is run by Germans, whilst the food is 
prepared by—mostly—Sri Lankan civilians. I am told that if they work here for a 
couple of years, they get German citizenship. This might indicate that this is 
theoretically not even Afghanistan. The camp tigers can, in their spare time, go to the 
German or American gym, to a pizza place, a coffee corner, or one of the two shops; 
one for cigarettes and chocolate, the other one for fancy military gear. In the 
evenings, they sit with their laptops in their bunk beds or drink a malt beer or a soda 
in the “Lion’s Rock”—the Dutch bar—where they can also play some pool, table 
tennis, darts, or poker. The next morning, they collectively drink coffee, watch 
yesterday’s news, and get their morning briefing. I attend once and learn that one 
important message is to ration plastic cups, because, like the snacks, these cups always 
get delivered late, and less are delivered than the number ordered. (field notes, 
January 2016, Afghanistan)  
The discrepancy between the detailed PowerPoint presentation and the rather loose 
verbal instructions in case of an emergency was not only slightly worrying; it also 
summed up my observation of the two realities of military practice. The discrepancy 
between seemingly banal topics such as snacks, the rationing of plastic cups, and the 
daily routines on the one hand, and their professional presence in supposedly one of 
the most dangerous areas in the world on the other, was striking. Contradictions such 
as these seemed an inherent part of military practice on this mission. A major is rather 
pessimistic:  
What we do is to send out a lieutenant with maybe 70 people to the “sandbox” [i.e. 
Afghanistan]. There he should talk to civil representatives and village elders, and then 
he is expected to “act in a stabilising manner,” all on his own… He is maybe 23, 24 
years old. (Major, field notes, February, 2017) 
This statement suggests the impossibility of the assignment: a young commander is 
supposed to “stabilise” a warzone, with barely sufficient experience or people.  
2.5 Discussion: Organising Uncertainty 
The observations and interview data illustrate how infantry personnel in the Dutch 
military experience a contradiction between uncertainty and standardisation. The 
above also demonstrates that both the domestic and the expeditionary military 
environments have (at least) two faces that are not necessarily compatible. From an 
ethnographic point of view, it is interesting to note that the rhetoric of the military 
and its personnel focuses on the complexity of military work and the importance of 
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flexibility under unknown circumstances, whilst their daily lives are mainly focussed 
on processes of standardisation.  
The existence of processes of standardisation in combination with an uncertain 
environment does not in itself present an untenable situation, and there surely are 
plenty of (military) skills and drills that prove useful, even (or perhaps especially) when 
the world is uncertain. However, as Weick and Sutcliffe (2007, p. 41) argue, when an 
organisation is designed on the premise that the whole world can be captured using 
clear-cut processes, the focus on standardisation is the very thing that makes dealing 
with uncertainty difficult. This triggers an existential question for the military, namely: 
How can an organisation that is explicitly destined to have an impact on unstable 
environments be designed according to principles that “belong” to stable situations? 
Obviously, it is not possible to run an organisation of this size without any form of 
standardisation and procedures, however, the question is whether the level at which 
things are organised offers enough space for manoeuvre in uncertain circumstances.  
Through the lens of the conceptual framework introduced earlier, the military 
organisation seems organised in a classic way, whilst acting in an environment that is 
highly uncertain. The problem here, as Weick and Sutcliff (2007) argue, is that 
“unexpected events can get them [classic organisations] into trouble” (p. 41). Because 
of the organisational design, there is a risk of focusing mostly on internal processes. 
“The assumptions, which are embedded in its routines, rules, norms, training, and 
roles, establish orderly guidelines for performance and interpretation” (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 41). However, if an organisation believes that all systems are in place 
in order to produce the “right” or expected outcomes, it ceases to reflect critically on 
its own systems. “When people form expectations, they assume that certain sequences 
of actions are likely to happen” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 41). Hence, a pertinent 
risk of this type of organisation is not so much that people have “unlearned” their 
ability to deal with uncertainty, but rather that standardisation becomes a goal in itself.  
Comparable dynamics can be found in other sectors that deal with high levels of 
uncertainty in combination with possible losses of life, for example, health care, where 
there is a tendency “to give greater emphasis to the actual process of doing their work 
than to the results of that process” (Bucher & Stelling, 1977, p. 283). Such 
organisations run the risk of becoming completely geared towards their own internal 
processes, whilst failing to adapt to whatever is happening in their environment. 
Instead of dealing with uncertainty, uncertainty is thus ignored. This resonates with 
Mary Uhl-Bien’s (2007) work on complexity leadership theory, which argues that the 
challenges that organisations face in a “fast-paced, volatile context” (p. 299) requires 
complexity in both leadership and organisation. Hence, what happens in the military 
is similar to developments in organisational theory. Moreover, Weick (2015) argues 
that “reliable organisations” need to learn how to “grasp ambiguity” (p. 122–123), in 
order to deal with complex environments.   
2.6 Conclusion  
Based on extensive fieldwork in the Dutch military, analysed in the context of theories 
on dealing with uncertainty, this article investigated how the contradiction between 
standardisation and uncertainty is manifested in the Dutch military, and assessed the 
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consequences for military education. This article aimed to illustrate how Dutch 
military personnel experience this contradiction. It established the idea that military 
practice has at least two sides—one of control and standardisation, and one of 
complexity and uncertainty. In the analysis, it was argued that this contradiction is not 
necessarily incompatible, because military mechanisms will work to a certain extent 
to deal with uncertainty. However, there are some risks to this type of classic 
organisational design.  
Whilst the complexities of military operations are widely acknowledged and might 
even be considered to have become largely taken for granted, simultaneously, the 
bureaucratic nature of the military is equally well-known and widely observed. 
Obviously, it is not possible to run an organisation of this size without any form of 
standardisation and procedures. However, the question is whether the degree to 
which things are organised offers enough space for manoeuvre in uncertain 
circumstances. A pertinent risk of this type of organisation is not so much that people 
have “unlearned” their ability to deal with uncertainty, but rather that it will become 
more difficult to respond flexibly to uncertainty. Thus, when it comes down to the 
external environment of the military, especially in its expeditionary work, the question 
remains if such an inward-oriented organisation is prepared for the uncertainty, 
unknowns, and complexities that are characteristic of their field of operation. 
Considering that one of the main ambitions of a military organisation is to have an 
impact on the world (fight a war, build peace, disarm conflicts, and promote political 
stability) in highly uncertain environments, it is very unlikely that their ambitions will 
be achieved by continuing to focus on internal standardisation.  
Suggestions for further research 
Based on this conclusion, it is suggested that these multiple military realities should 
be acknowledged in both the professional and the educational realms. In the 
professional realm, the possibility to question how to organise oneself most 
effectively in an insecure environment should be kept open. At a professional level, 
military organisations operating in insecure environments need a certain level of 
“open design”, in order to be able to have an impact on the external environments in 
which they operate. However, a risk for “open-designed” organisations is that they 
become a slave to their environments, as they are constantly adapting themselves to 
their surroundings. As a result, they might experience difficulties steering their own 
path, as their actions become mostly reactive. Hence, a legitimate question is when to 
adapt, and when to stay put. This question invites further research into flexible 
responses to uncertain environments. 
 
With regard to military education, another important discussion arises: cadets are 
destined to perform professionally in light of future challenges, but are educated 
according to a predominantly mechanistic worldview. Whilst this mechanistic way of 
organising might be current practice, this article questions whether this should indeed 
be the norm. It is suggested that military education should offer more than simply 
allowing personnel to deal with the discrepancy on their own. The current situation 
seems to be to deny the challenge of preparing cadets for the multiple realities of the 
military domain—complexity and uncertainty on the one hand, and well-ordered 
professionalism on the other. Thus, the question is how the existence of multiple 
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military realities and daily discrepancies can be acknowledged in military education 
and practice.    
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3 
BOURDIEU IN THE MILITARY: THE FIELD OF OFFICER 
TRAINING IN THREE AIR FORCES 
Jarrod Pendlebury  
Abstract 
nitial training at military academies and officer training schools is an intensive 
period of socialisation; the transformation of new recruits into functioning 
military officer is expected to occur within a relatively short timeframe. Often 
this training is conducted in a socially detached environment that closely resembles 
Erving Goffman’s “total institution”. By design, this social isolation seeks to focus 
the development of a unique military identity congruent with the values of the broader 
organization. Yet such social isolation can also breed norms and behaviours that 
contradict values espoused by the government a military is bound to serve. 
This chapter will mobilise Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of social practice in an effort to 
understand the construction of military identity in air force officer basic training. 
Drawing on focus group data from air force training schools in the UK, US and 
Australia, I will explore the unique environment of the officer training institution, 
presenting Royal Air Force College Cranwell, The United States Air Force Academy 
and The Australian Defence Force Academy as social fields serving to coordinate a 
coherent and uniform air force habitus. The chapter will argue that a Bourdieusian 
analysis of training institutions offers a way to understand how divergence can occur 
between the values and norms of Government and those of the military in a liberal 
democracy. Moreover, this chapter will demonstrate the utility of Bourdieu’s theory 
to contemporary efforts to create representative and inclusive military forces. 
Keywords: Bourdieu, habitus, field theory, military sociology, civil-military relations, women in the 
military, Goffman, total institutions, diversity, inclusion 
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3.1 Introduction 
Few other public institutions match the military’s ability to weather the forces of 
societal change. Despite the flattening of rigid social class hierarchies throughout the 
19th and 20th centuries, the overwhelming majority of militaries retain rank structures 
that construct a stark dichotomy between an upper (commissioned officer) and lower 
(enlisted ranks) class. Rank is one of many characteristics that indicate the unique 
I 
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social resilience of the military organisation; a phenomenon I will explore in this 
chapter.  
In the pages that follow, I will examine this social resilience by harnessing case studies 
of basic air force officer training in three liberal democratic states, the United States, 
the United Kingdom and Australia. In recent years, each government has grappled 
with questions surrounding the right of various members within society to serve. As 
suggested by US experiences with post Second World War racial integration, “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell”, and the current debates surrounding the rights of transgender 
personnel, a disconnect exists between the social and political values espoused by 
some liberal democratic governments and those practiced by the military. The aim of 
this chapter therefore, is to apply sociological theory to the field of air force basic 
officer training in an effort to provide some reasons why military institutions in liberal, 
democratic states can remain resistant to broader political and social norms. 
While the military has long been of interest to the sociological academy, it presents a 
variety of challenges to the critical sociologist. For instance, barriers to research are 
woven into the very purpose of the organisation; such as the physical limits placed on 
outsiders in the form of access control to facilities and members. Scholars have also 
suggested that the instrumental purpose of the organisation limits the scope of much 
academic enquiry, resulting in an institutional reluctance to support research that lacks 
a specific instrumental outcome (Harries-Jenkins & Moskos, 1981, p. 3). Still others 
have observed that the complex social environment presented by the military 
demands a multi-disciplinary approach, meaning that findings are diffused across a 
wide literature, rather than “housed” within a single discourse (Kümmel, 2003, p. 
417). 
In a 2008 article published in The Australian Defence Force Journal, the Australian 
sociologist and Army Reserve Brigadier Nick Jans opines the state of military 
sociology in Australia. In particular, he points to the general lack of interest in the 
discipline within the Australian academic community – including, notably, The 
Australian Defence Force Academy – suggesting it would be “safe to say that very 
few Australian officers are aware that there is such a field as military sociology and 
that it can inform on practical ‘people issues’ in the military institution” (Jans, 2008, 
p. 43). Jans further underscores his argument by contrasting the interest in the US, 
UK and Canada where a “strong nucleus of scholars”, supported by the military, 
conduct research and teaching from established positions within military academies 
and staff colleges (Jans, 2008, p. 43). It is telling that the recommendations arising 
from his paper (the establishment of two military sociology positions at key Australian 
tertiary institutions, and Australian Defence Force sponsorship of regular military 
sociology conferences) are yet to be implemented, ten years hence.  
In sum, there appears to be evidence to support Jans’ lament as to the “sorry state of 
military sociology” (Jans, 2008, p. 43), and in this chapter, I seek to help redress a 
limitation I see in the literature: a reluctance to draw on wider social theory. This 
chapter will harness the social theory of Pierre Bourdieu in an effort to bridge the gulf 
between military sociology and the broader discipline. In doing so, I will draw on 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice, positing the basic officer training environment as a 
social field in which a cadet’s existing habitus is molded and shaped through an intense 
socialisation process; the purpose being to produce a junior officer who will act 
reliably and predictably following graduation. The utility of Bourdieu’s theory to this 
  
23 
project emerged through an iterative process; with the design of initial fieldwork 
informed by Erving Goffman’s theory of Presentation, and Judith Butler’s concept 
of Performativity (Butler, 2006, 2011; Goffman, 1959). During early data analysis it 
became apparent that while a sequential deployment of these theories enabled the 
construction of a basic model of identity construction (Pendlebury, 2018), such 
analysis was limited to explaining how ideal identities came to be constructed and 
perpetuated, rather than why certain embodied characteristics become the basis of 
these ideal identities. As this chapter will argue, Bourdieu’s theory provides a useful 
macro lens or framework, inside of which the micro processes of identity construction 
operate. 
Drawing on qualitative data collected in the course of focus groups at air force officer 
training establishments in the UK, US and Australia, this chapter will focus on basic 
training’s process of identity construction as a significant location where the social 
norms and behaviours of the broader organisation are demonstrated and reinforced. 
Ultimately, through Bourdieu’s lens, I seek to demonstrate how the military 
institutions in the US, UK and Australia can remain resistant to the implementation 
of social norms that fully reflect liberal, democratic values. 
The chapter begins with an overview of the broad guiding principles of civil-military 
relations in the liberal democratic state, in which I suggest that a disjuncture exists 
between the norms and values of such a state and those practiced in the military. 
Bourdieu’s work will then be presented as a way of making sense of the reasons 
behind such a disjuncture, at which point I will sketch the key elements of his theory 
of social practice. After some preliminary comments on the method underpinning my 
qualitative data gathering in support of this research, I will use these data schematically 
in an effort to show how Bourdieu’s theory can illuminate the way that unique, military 
cultures are created and perpetuated in the armed forces, at the same time that liberal 
societal norms are resisted. 
3.2 Civil-Military Relations in the Liberal Democratic State 
The debate surrounding the ideal relationship between the liberal democratic state 
and its military has drawn heavily on the work of two scholars, Samuel Huntington 
and Morris Janowitz. In The Soldier and The State, Huntington argues for a clear 
delineation between the social and political values espoused by the government, and 
those cultivated in the military (Huntington, 1957, p. 64). Conversely, Janowitz sees a 
necessary link between the values of the state and its representative institutions, 
arguing that it is necessary for the military to reflect the “goals of democratic political 
control” (Janowitz, 1960, p. 440). 
The intense public debate surrounding the inclusion of women in the military 
(Maginnis, 2013; Medina, 2016; Norman, 2018), combined with slow achievement of 
inclusion policy outcomes (Australian Institute of Family Studies, 1991; Department 
of Defence, 2015) suggests an unresolved tension between the Huntingtonian and 
Janowitzian models. While it is outside my scope here to address this debate, my 
argument below rests on the premise that, in a liberal democratic state, the military 
should broadly reflect the values and norms of the government it serves; a view 
expressed by each of the three governments studied in this chapter (Her Majesty's 
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Government, 2015, p. 6; Payne, 2017; United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011, p. 16). 
Indeed, contrary to instrumentalist arguments that advocate for an “unrestrained” 
military, governments frequently place boundaries on their militaries to align with the 
nation’s espoused values. The Australian Government’s ban on the use of anti-
personnel landmines is an example here (Government of Australia, 1997). 
If then, we are to accept that a liberal democratic government can reasonably expect 
its military to reflect its values and norms, the question arises as to why, despite 
extensive policy initiatives and directives (Department of Defence, 2012; Her 
Majesty's Government, 2015; James, Welsh, & Cody, 2015), levels of representation 
of various social groups – particularly women – remain low (Department of  Defence, 
2016; Lim, Mariano, Cox, Schulker, & Hanser, 2014; Ministry of  Defence, 2018)? Put 
more simply, how does the military in a liberal democratic state remain resistant to 
liberal democratic norms such as equality of opportunity and freedom of choice for 
the individual? What mechanisms enable it to remain a stable social microcosm, 
exhibiting class and social structures that are particularly resistant to change? Here, I 
believe Pierre Bourdieu’s work provides some useful tools to explore such questions. 
Much of Bourdieu’s scholarship focuses on the structures and processes influencing 
social practice, and central to his theory are the concepts of habitus, capital and field. 
For Bourdieu, social behaviour and norms result from a complex interplay between 
the three, and it is noteworthy that he views the relationship as co-constitutive; a 
modification to any one element affects not only the resultant social practice, but also 
the other two elements.  
Bourdieu’s concept of field provides a useful departure point when analysing his theory 
in the context of the military, as it does a great deal of work in establishing the social 
environment and structure within which he suggests social practice emerges: 
[The field is] a structured social space, a field of  forces, a force field. It contains people 
who dominate and people who are dominated. Constant, permanent relationships of  
inequality operate inside this space, which at the same time becomes a space in which 
various actors struggle for the transformation or preservation of  the field. All the 
individuals in this universe bring to the competition all the (relative) power at their 
disposal. It is this power that defines their position in the field and, as a result, their 
strategies (Bourdieu, 1998, pp. 40–41). 
Of note is Bourdieu’s emphasis on inequality, or power imbalance as characteristic of 
the field. Also of interest is his use of terms such as “universe” and “space”, which 
resonate with other analyses of the military that posit the organisation as a closed 
social system par excellence (Freeman, 1948, p. 79; Goffman, 1961, p. 5; Huntington, 
1957, p. 465; Janowitz, 1960, pp. 204–208). For Bourdieu then, within a single society, 
a variety of fields operate according to their own logics, in which social actors harness 
their relative power to negotiate the social environment. Importantly, this relative 
power can be accrued through both formal (by rank or appointment, for instance) 
and informal means (such as seniority or the possession of particular skills, 
experiences or attributes), an area to which I will return later in the chapter. It is within 
this sense that I posit the military as a Bourdieusian field. 
Another sociologist, Erving Goffman provides an additional model to allow us an 
insight into how the military is capable of remaining isolated to the extent that it can 
form its own “logics”. In Asylums, Goffman presents the concept of the “total 
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institution”; a useful lens through which we can gain a sense of the type of field 
represented by the military: 
The central feature of total institutions can be described as the breakdown of the 
barriers ordinarily separating these three spheres of life [sleep, play and work]. First, 
all aspects of life are conducted in the same place and under the same single authority. 
Second, each phase of the member’s daily activity is carried on in the immediate 
company of a large batch of others, all of whom are treated alike and required to do 
the same thing together. Third, all phases of the day’s activities are tightly scheduled, 
with one activity leading at a pre-arranged time into the next, the whole sequence of 
activities being imposed from above by a system of explicit formal rulings and a body 
of officials. Finally, the various enforced activities are brought together into a single 
rational plan purportedly designed to fulfill the official aims of the institution 
(Goffman, 1961, p. 6). 
For Goffman then, a key characteristic of the total institution is “isolation” from a 
normalised world; a concept that resonates closely with the world of the military, 
particularly in basic training institutions, where new recruits’ lives closely resemble 
those he describes above. Moreover, the life of a new recruit is permeated with an 
awareness of significant power imbalance. Indeed, this can be understood as the 
primary purpose of such training, which seeks to inculcate junior members into a 
steeply hierarchical organisation. Officer cadets are frequently reminded of their 
uniquely lowly status since enlisted members – the cadets’ future subordinates – 
exercise authority over them while under training. 
In the following analysis, I will therefore treat the social environment created in basic 
officer training as a Bourdieusian field; a coherent “universe” in which clear power 
imbalances are perpetuated and harnessed in order to transform (the new recruits) 
while also preserving the extant power structures inherent in military hierarchies. 
With power imbalance as central to his concept of field, Bourdieu necessarily devotes 
a great deal of attention to the mechanisms through which this relative power is 
displayed and deployed. Capital is the term he applies to describe “assets that bring 
social and cultural advantage or disadvantage” (Moore, 2008, p. 104), and his use of 
the term encompasses a wide variety of “assets” acquired through an individual’s 
experience in the cultural, economic, linguistic, academic and social realms. 
Bourdieu further delineates capital into that which he describes as objectified (such as 
an art work) or embodied. The latter is of most interest to this analysis, as it describes 
capital incorporated into the body of a social actor (Moore, 2008, p. 105), an idea 
holding useful explanatory power when analysing basic military training. For Bourdieu 
then, capital is at once intangible (apparent in one’s taste in music, for example), while 
also readily apparent in an embodied sense. For an organisation such as the military 
that is uniquely focused on uniformity of appearance, symbols and iconography, 
Bourdieu’s idea of capital helps unpack how and why certain characteristics denote 
privileged status within the field of military basic training. 
Finally, the concept of habitus is central to much of Bourdieu’s work, and represents 
one of his major contributions to sociological theory. For Bourdieu: 
The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence 
produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate 
  
26 
and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their 
outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of 
the operations necessary in order to attain them. Objectively “regulated” and 
“regular” without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be 
collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a 
conductor (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 53).  
Bourdieu’s emphasis on the structural underpinnings of social practice is evident here, 
further reinforcing the utility of his theory of practice to a rigidly hierarchical 
organisation such as the military. To Bourdieu, habitus fundamentally informs and 
shapes our response to the social environment, and it does so in a manner that 
transcends intentionality. This is not to say that social agents act as mere automatons, 
but rather that these “transposable dispositions” enable a suite of available strategies 
that serve to limit the available responses to any given social situation. Importantly, 
the social field and an agent’s available capital strongly influence the range and scope 
of these strategies, underscoring the co-constitutive nature of the elements of 
Bourdieu’s theory. 
A useful analogy to illustrate the nature of habitus is that of a game. Played out on a 
field, a game is governed by rules that constrain, but do not force a player’s actions. In 
a social field, as with sport, the most successful “players” demonstrate a “proleptic 
adjustment to the demands of the field […] a ‘feel for the game’” (Bourdieu, 1990b, 
p. 66). As on the sporting field, this “feel for the game” results from experience 
informed by structures such as the laws of the game and the field, but is not readily 
demonstrated solely through an understanding of (or “obedience” to) the rules. 
Likewise, an authentic (and effective) “feel for the game” transcends intentionality, 
and is evident in the “ease” with which the possessors of cultural capital navigate the 
social space of art: 
The competence of  the “connoisseur”, an unconscious mastery of  the instruments of  
appropriation which derives from slow familiarization and is the basis of  familiarity 
with works, is an “art”, a practical mastery which, like an art of  thinking or an art of  
living, cannot be transmitted solely by precept or prescription. Learning it presupposes 
the equivalent of  the prolonged contact between disciple and master in a traditional 
education, i.e., repeated contact with cultural works and cultured people (Bourdieu, 
2010, p. 59). 
Thus, as is the case with the connoisseur, the habitus is formed through repeated 
contact with social environments that build and refine an agent’s “toolbox” of 
transposable dispositions. Viewed through such a Bourdieusian lens, military basic 
training represents an environment in which new recruits – already possessing a 
habitus formed in their civilian lives – undergo a process of socialisation in which it 
is intended that a new, “military” habitus is formed. 
3.3 Method 
This chapter draws upon qualitative fieldwork conducted between 2015 and 2018 at 
five air force officer training institutions in three countries. Each of these countries – 
The United Kingdom, The United States of America and Australia – have political 
systems that can be broadly described as liberal democratic, with all three placing 
significant emphasis on the primacy of the individual and individual rights. 
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While three of the military institutions focus on providing the minimum level of 
training for an air force officer, the other two deliver tertiary education in parallel with 
officer training. I will refer to the former (The Royal Air Force (RAF) College 
Cranwell, Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Officers’ Training School (OTS) and 
the US Air Force’s (USAF) Officer Training School (OTS)) as “direct entry” 
establishments, while the remaining two (The Australian Defence Force Academy 
(ADFA) and The United States Air Force Academy (USAFA)) I will term 
“academies”. 
I conducted a series of focus groups at each institution in an effort to gather narratives 
indicating cadets’ understanding of the ideal characteristics of an air force officer. 
Focus groups were chosen as an efficient method enabling the collection of narratives 
from a much larger sample of cadets than individual interviews would allow. This was 
an important consideration given the tight schedules of officer cadets, particularly at 
direct entry establishments where cadets were expected to learn the essential skills and 
knowledge expected of a junior officer in as few as eight weeks. In each focus group, 
I moderated a semi-structured discussion guided by a series of questions designed to 
draw narratives from cadets relating to their perceptions of what characteristics 
contributed to a model of an “ideal” air force officer.  
A key requirement of ethics approval at each institution was full disclosure of my 
status as a serving air force officer. To this end, I began each session with a short 
introduction in which I provided a brief overview of my career, as well as a synopsis 
of the project. Although it is difficult to discern how this disclosure of myself as a 
military “insider” affected the data, I was relieved to find most participants eager to 
engage in the discussion, and the frankness of some narratives allayed my fears that 
the cadets would be reluctant to divulge their true thoughts to a senior air force 
officer. 
Each session began with questions seeking to understand participants’ motivations 
for joining, as well as their perceptions of air force identity prior to joining. I was 
particularly interested in whether cadets were inspired by any particular role models 
prior to joining. Following these initial questions, the discussions focused on cadets’ 
experiences during their basic training, with particular emphasis on concepts of 
belonging and identity. The primary aim of each focus group was to seek an 
understanding of the types of identities that cadets valued, with these narratives 
building a dataset I could subsequently compare and contrast with official discourse 
to see whether these “ideal” identities were congruent with the inclusive “diverse” air 
force each nation forming part of this project seeks to build. 
At each venue, I aimed to convene three unique sets of focus groups, mixed gender, 
female only, and male only, however the combination of cadet availability and tight 
schedule pressures made it impossible to collect female only data at USAFA and 
ADFA. Each focus group consisted of between 3-10 participants, all of whom were 
undergoing officer training at the time of the focus group. The age range of 
participants varied depending on the institution with USAF trainees, on average, being 
younger than their UK and Australian contemporaries.6 Overall, participant ages 
                                              
6 The eligibility requirements at the USAFA were the most stringent with respect to age. Applicants 
must be “[a]t least 17 but not past [their] 23rd birthday by July 1 of the year [they] enter the Academy” 
(USAFA, 2018). 
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ranged from 18 to 50, and a total of 31 focus groups were convened during which I 
collected narratives from 208 participants7. The subsequent data were coded using 
content and discourse analysis.  
3.4 Analysis 
Although widely applied across a vast array of social environments including para-
miltary organisations such as police (Chan, 1997), it is puzzling that Bourdieu’s theory 
remains sparsely deployed by military sociologists. As outlined above, his emphasis 
on structure and capital, combined with the clearly demarcated nature of the military 
as a social field (denoted by the existence of a word to describe those who do not 
belong: “civilians”) suggests significant utility of his work in unpacking the 
construction and perpetuation of military identities and behavioural norms. 
Moreover, through deconstructing the inputs to social practice, Bourdieu’s theory can 
help point to discrete processes and practices that may remain uncovered in 
atheoretical approaches to military cultural change. In the following section therefore, 
I will analyse the qualitative data gathered in the course of my fieldwork through 
Bourdieu’s lens in order to demonstrate how a unique military field is constituted as 
a microcosm within the broader liberal democratic society. In doing so, I also hope 
to demonstrate the contribution I believe Bourdieu’s work can make to military 
sociology, particularly to studies focusing on the arena of basic military training.  
Once again, I will use field as the entry point. As total institutions, the militaries of 
liberal, democratic states have, over hundreds of years, developed a unique set of 
cultural and social norms that differentiate themselves from other organisations. In 
the case of the US, UK and Australia, a commonality – borne of traditions developed 
in the British Army and Royal Navy – is evident in many areas ranging from rank 
terminology to the broader organisational structure. The perpetuation, and indeed 
celebration, of a distinction from the “civilian” world reinforces the accuracy of 
descriptions of the military as a total institution, and more broadly, a Bourdieusian 
social field. 
Such parallels are still more striking at the micro level of the basic officer training 
institution. Despite variations across institution type and country, all of the training 
units forming part of this research project fulfilled each of Goffman’s criteria for a 
total institution. First, all trainees conduct their training in the same institution, under 
the same authority (Goffman, 1961, p. 6). Each of the units from which participants 
were drawn was a dedicated officer training institution. As distinct from an 
operational squadron that might be responsible for both the training and operational 
employment of personnel, basic training is most often conducted within dedicated 
training units. In each case examined in this analysis, officer training was delivered via 
intensive, residential blocks. At USAFA and the three direct entry units, an obligation 
exists for cadets to remain “in residence” for the duration of the period of training. 
ADFA stands alone as an institution allowing cadets to reside in off-base 
accommodation in cases where the member has family obligations (ie an 
interdependent partnership, or dependent children). Of note, such arrangements at 
                                              
7 Detailed participant numbers were as follows: USAFA – 35, RAF Cranwell – 31, ADFA – 16, RAAF 
OTS – 61, USAF OTS – 65. 
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ADFA are suspended during certain training blocks where residence is mandatory, 
such as Year One Familiarisation Training (YOFT) and exercise deployments. All five 
institutions, therefore, create an environment at various points, where “all aspects of 
life are conducted in the same place and under the same single authority” (Goffman, 
1961, p. 6). 
Goffman’s second criterion for a total institution concerns day-to-day activity, where 
“each phase of the member’s daily activity is carried on in the immediate company of 
a large batch of others, all of whom are treated alike and required to do the same thing 
together” (Goffman, 1961, p. 6). In this sense, the field of the basic officer institution 
is the clearest representation of collective training the air force officer will undergo in 
their career. Unlike subsequent, operationally-focused training (such as learning to fly 
or training as an Air Traffic Controller) which tends to be conducted in comparatively 
smaller groups – the field of officer training brings together a large number of 
personnel who are expected to undergo a uniform process by which they will learn 
the knowledge and skills necessary to be competent, junior leaders. Although each 
group I spoke with included members who had previously served as enlisted 
personnel (variously labeled “re-treads”, “ex-rankers” or “prior-enlisted”), this 
conferred no special privilege. Indeed, a number of these members observed that 
while their previous service was useful in certain areas (such as drill and uniform 
maintenance), it was not sufficient to prepare them for the academic aspects of the 
training, where many sought the assistance of their colleagues who had no previous 
military experience. It became apparent from the data that air force officer basic 
training, in all three countries, represented an environment in which all members 
underwent the same course, facing challenges in various areas depending on their 
background. 
Air force officer training also reflects a third characteristic of a total institution, where 
“all phases of the day’s activities are tightly scheduled, with one activity leading at a 
pre-arranged time into the next, the whole sequence of activities being imposed from 
above by a system of explicit formal rulings and a body of officials” (Goffman, 1961, 
p. 6). As I articulated above, this was particularly evident in the case of the academies, 
where cadets frequently reported their experience in negotiating a tightly managed 
program where there was little margin for error: 
I remember being left behind while the sergeant made them run ahead, and getting 
there at least 10 to 20 minutes late to the next class, simply because of that [a minor 
injury affecting the cadet’s ability to keep up with her classmates] (Female ADFA 
First Year cadet). 
Goffman’s reference to formal rulings is also of interest here. In a similar way to how 
a cadet responds to the “demands of the field” (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 66) through the 
development of  an innate and informal “feel for the game” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 9), 
the new recruit’s navigation of  the basic training field is also informed and governed 
by a complex array of  formal orders, instructions and publications. By overlaying 
Goffman’s and Bourdieu’s theories across the field of  basic officer training, one could 
argue that it is both the formalised rule structure of  the military, as well as the more 
informal social interactions that coalesce to give a unique character to this 
Bourdieusian field. 
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Finally, and most obviously, the field of  military basic training represents an 
environment in which “the various enforced activities are brought together into a 
single rational plan purportedly designed to fulfill the official aims of the institution” 
(Goffman, 1961, p. 6). As I articulated above, the basic training unit is unique in its 
singularity of focus on the ends to be achieved. Although clearly a busy work 
environment, these establishments are rarely subject to the vagaries of operational 
activities, resulting in a tendency for them to develop institutional inertia or 
conservatism. Historically, at its most extreme, this has manifested itself in cases of 
hazing by senior academy cadets who perpetuated cultures of abuse by insisting that 
rituals they endured as new recruits must be inflicted on each new class in order to 
establish “the pecking order” (Goyne A et al., 2017, p. 73; Graney, 2010; McCoy, 
1999, p. 199). 
[Hazing] is an illicit rite of passage (against the rules of the institution) that provides 
opportunities for veteran members to include or exclude new members on the basis 
of a variety of trials that involve varying degrees of physical and psychological stress 
[…] newcomers submit to whatever torture or trials are asked of them, comforted 
by the assurance that all abuse will cease after the organisation declares them full 
members. During the next cycle, the new veterans get to turn the tables and haze the 
next set of newcomers (Nuwer, 2018, pp. 31–32). 
Data gathered during my fieldwork suggest the existence of other processes that work 
in a similar manner, often remaining latent due to a veneer of normativity. For 
instance some focus group participants articulated sentiments surrounding a need for 
senior cadets to “maintain standards” in relatively insignificant facets of basic training: 
When it comes to eating at basic, we always had to do specific things to get things. I 
think about the freshmen from when we were sophomores, and when those 
freshmen came in, they would just waltz around like they owned the place. I feel that 
was ... it was… they didn't have that right, technically. I think just because I was a 
sophomore, and in my mind, I was, "Who are these people to come in here like that?" 
We would have got dropped on the spot if we would have did something like that 
(Male USAFA First Degree (Senior) cadet). 
In bemoaning the reduced standards to which junior cadets are held (compared with 
his time as a four degree (junior) cadet), this cadet highlights the singularity of purpose 
of the academy, namely, the development of naïve, civilian recruits into military 
officers. More broadly, his comments are also reflective of the way in which such 
singularity of focus can be used to argue for “the way things have always been done”, 
reinforcing institutional inertia, resistance to change and the normative value of such 
micro processes that serve to control the behaviour and attitudes of trainees. The 
concept of resistance to change is one to which I will return later in the chapter. 
Through the lens of Goffman’s theory therefore, air force basic officer training is 
clearly a total institution, which tells a great deal about the specific type of Bourdieusian 
field it represents – a bounded social environment, governed and informed by rules 
in which “constant, permanent relationships of  inequality operate” (Bourdieu, 1998, 
p. 40). 
As I highlight above, for Bourdieu, capital represents a type of currency helping agents 
negotiate the social field. As we have seen, he describes the field as a space where: 
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all the individuals in this universe bring to the competition all the (relative) 
power at their disposal. It is this power that defines their position in the field 
and, as a result, their strategies (Bourdieu, 1998, pp. 40–41). 
The term “relative power” here refers to capital, which is clearly central to unlocking 
and enabling the strategies available to an individual agent. Put more simply, the 
amount and type of capital available to a social agent fundamentally influences the 
strategies they can deploy in the field, and therefore, the formation and content of the 
habitus. 
I spoke earlier of the importance of symbols and iconography in military 
organisations. Much can be ascertained from the appearance (or absence) of various 
symbols and accoutrements on the uniform of an air force member. For example, in 
the RAAF, a member’s uniform carries a great number of markers indicating the 
capital available to the individual. For instance, aircrew are differentiated by the 
wearing of a “brevet” (or “wings”) denoting their particular specialisation. Similarly, 
the course of the member’s career can be deduced by the ribbons or medals that 
represent various types and quality of service. These ribbons will denote whether the 
member has undertaken active (warlike) service, for how long they have served, and 
whether they have been recognised for acts of exceptional or distinguished service, or 
heroic acts. Each ribbon is presented in a strict, formalised “order of precedence”, 
which serves to accord significant prestige to the recipients of the highest orders 
(Government of Australia, 2007). In addition to badges of specialisation and honours, 
all air force uniforms allow for the display of badges of rank, perhaps the most visible 
and enduring representation of social standing in any occupation.  
All these physical representations of status represent embodied capital that, in a 
Bourdieusian social field, strongly influences the agency and social standing of an 
individual. Through a similar process, capital also circumscribes the strategies 
available to a social agent. For example, members of the lowest officer rank – Officer 
Cadet in the RAAF – have limited access to senior leadership in order to influence 
decision making with respect to their social environment. Cadets articulated such a 
reality during focus groups: 
You know, like, if I need a form signed from my DO [Divisional Officer – a staff 
member of Lieutenant/Captain/Flight Lieutenant rank], I need to go through the 
cadet DDO [Divisional Duty Officer], who takes it to the sergeant, who takes it to 
the DO. And it's just really unnecessary, and it makes you sort of feel like ... I don't 
know, especially [in] my division…we always feel like we can't go to staff. Like we 
often put off issues that need to be dealt with, because we feel intimidated. But like, 
we're going to be bothering them, by just asking them for something. And it really 
shouldn't be like that. (Female ADFA First Year Cadet). 
The embodied capital described above can be seen to operate in a formal sense, and 
is a common artefact of such a strictly hierarchical organisation. Moreover, strict 
adherence to elaborate chains of command are a common element of basic training, 
designed to build professionalism in cadets (through the emphasis on bureaucratic 
process) while simultaneously reinforcing their lowly position in the organisation.  
There are however, other forms of capital that similarly influence an individual’s 
available social strategies, but operate in an informal sense. Data gathered from each 
training institution suggested that gender represents something of an informal social 
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marker. The emphasis on gender as a source of capital varied across the institutions, 
with the academies yielding the most striking data suggesting that being male assigned 
a relatively higher social status than being female: 
I have been ridiculed because I put so much emphasis on my family, especially since 
I am married and I put so much emphasis on my husband and my family of two, 
[and I have faced] a lot of ridicule because they think that you are not suited for 
Defence, because guys can go away for three months and not have to worry about it 
because there is a stereotype that men can be away from their kids for three months. 
Whereas the stereotype [is] that women can't, you can't be away from your kid for 
more than a day or you are a bad mother kind of thing (Female ADFA Third Year 
cadet). 
In the US, discussions surrounding gender tended to focus on perceived, generalised 
– and essentialised – differences in strength and endurance, as well as the popular 
notion that women represented a risk in combat due to – again in an essentialised 
sense – men’s natural inclination to “protect women”: 
Like, women are generally not as good at pull-ups as guys are. That's just how 
physically it works. There's nothing you can do about that. I mean, are there 
exceptions? Obviously yes, but in general […] [physical standards] are designed to 
keep people alive in the situations that have been experienced. I think you can't adjust 
that just to make someone happy or to make it so someone else can join. It's just like 
saying, “well, then let's allow people who don't have arms to be infantrymen”, then 
you can't do the job, but should we adjust the rules to make it so this group of people 
can do something [when] they're not physically able to do the job as well? (Male 
USAFA Three Degree (Sophomore) cadet). 
[D]own range, at forward operating bases men don't actually…I guess [have] 
communication with women on a very often basis. So, those few women who do 
make it through those tests are now subjected to all these guys. As much as we like 
to have integrity and state our core values as the military, men obviously have certain 
instincts and that could cause problems. Not only that, but it’s also a man’s intuition 
to protect a woman so I've heard of special operators saying they've had women with 
them down range and, of course, not on clandestine missions or anything of that 
nature. But, when something happened to [those] women, then men would do 
something they normally wouldn't do, break their own rules and barriers to protect 
her, and then ultimately expose the rest of their unit (Male USAFA Three Degree 
cadet). 
Thus, in a way related to how relative power in the military social field is formally 
represented (by rank and other physical embellishments), we can see that a similar 
effect is achieved informally, by the assignment of relative status in other areas, such as 
gender. As the data above suggests, within basic training institutions, women, by 
virtue of their apparent gender, are often assigned a relatively lower status than males. 
In a Bourdieusian sense then, the existence of this – often latent – microprocess 
moderating gender relations limits the strategies available to women as social agents. 
Moreover, by artificially bounding the available modes and quantity of capital, the 
development of habitus, which can be seen as a primary goal of basic training, is 
significantly affected. 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus has been deployed widely to help explain social practice 
in a large number of disparate fields, however it is, as I observe above, noticeably 
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absent from much of the literature associated with military sociology. This is 
unfortunate, as I believe habitus represents a useful prism – in concert with 
Bourdieu’s broader theory of social practice – to unpack both how identities are 
developed and perpetuated in air force basic officer training, but also which particular 
identities predominate. In helping understand these processes, I see Bourdieu’s theory 
as a useful way to unpack the fundamental reasons behind the military’s divergence 
from liberal, democratic norms in the US, UK and Australia. 
As outlined earlier, Bourdieu describes habitus as a set of “transposable dispositions, 
structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures” (Bourdieu, 
1990b, p. 53). This structural aspect hints at a dual role of habitus as both rooted in 
the past, or “structured by conditions of existence” while also informing and shaping 
one’s current and future social practice in a structuring way (Maton, 2008, p. 51). 
Habitus’ dual nature, at once conservative while also forward looking or “structuring” 
resonates closely with the dichotomous nature of contemporary air forces. Of the 
three major military services, air forces have perhaps the most complicated task in 
resolving the tension between tradition and technology. This has become even more 
apparent in recent years, with air forces becoming something of a “catch-all” 
organisation for new capabilities. Consequently, the traditional role of an air force – 
the application of air power (Royal Australian Air Force, 2013, p. 31) – has been 
augmented with emerging capabilities. Some, such as Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) 
have a close connection with the air force’s traditional role. Others, such as space 
power have a clearly tangential relationship while still others, such as cyber operations 
seem to have been placed within the purview of air forces due to its reputation as the 
most “technological” service. 
All this is to say that fundamentally, habitus, as both “structured” and “structuring”, 
represents a powerful tool through which to analyse social practice in the air force. 
While an in-depth exploration of habitus warrants much greater detail than is possible 
in this chapter, my aim here is to briefly sketch the processes and mechanisms through 
which habitus can mould and influence social practice, thereby working to reaffirm 
and reinforce social norms and processes that are, in some cases, in disagreement with 
liberal democratic tenets.  
Representations of basic military training are ubiquitous in popular culture. During 
focus groups, cadets described the influence of cinema and other mass media (such 
as YouTube) in providing cadets with expectations as to what they would endure 
during their introduction to the military. In many cases, reality failed to match these 
expectations: 
Before I came here, I wanted to get ready for basic training, like get as prepared as I 
could get, so I watched tons of YouTube videos and stuff on basic training. I saw 
certain aspects of basic training but the majority of ones that I watched were 
operational, for like enlistment, so they were much different. They were more mental 
than physical, those basic trainings. However, the academy, it was a lot more physical 
than I thought. The beat sessions, if you call them, were a lot more physically 
demanding and the wake-ups were more – I couldn't have been prepared for that. 
[…] Like, the way you eat meals and stuff, I was not expecting it to be like it was... 
so even the smallest movement of your head, you're getting yelled at for. So there 
was a lot of things that surprised me, but I knew it was gonna be rough, so…I was 
really coming in with that expectation to be army, rah rah rah down the line every 
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day. I mean, its still like hard work but not as hard as I thought (Male USAFA Four 
Degree cadet). 
There's other little things that I found, like just sensitivity levels are a bit higher than 
I was expecting. I wasn’t expecting Full Metal Jacket per se, but there were things 
that have happened where someone’s gone back after it crying because you’ve 
dropped a swear word in after telling someone six times, and I feel like if you’re in 
the military, man up and crack on with that…(Male RAF Cranwell officer cadet) 
The apparent disjuncture between reality and popular representations of basic training 
suggests a complex method by which the habitus of a recruit is influenced and shaped 
during basic training. 
Basic military training is often described as a process through which the civilian 
identity is “broken down”, to be replaced with one more congruent with the military 
environment (Janowitz, 1960, pp. 127–131; Schemo, 2010, p. 6). The veracity of such 
a formulation was evident in the data. Very few cadets reported basic training as an 
easy process, and indeed many suggested that it was an experience for which nothing 
could have prepared them. Through Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of habitus as a 
series of “transposable dispositions”, this would suggest that, in the majority of cases, 
the dispositions necessary to negotiate oneself effectively through the social field of 
the military are unique to a military habitus or at least very rarely taken on in civilian 
life.  
It follows therefore, that in addition to learning a variety of instrumental skills during 
basic training, cadets are expected to develop these uniquely military dispositions or 
more simply: develop a military habitus. In seeking to understand the first key 
question here, which is how identities are formulated in basic training, it is useful to 
recall Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of habitus as a “structured structure”, highlighting 
the importance of the past as a key reference point. In the military, this is a fairly 
simple connection to make. Again, symbols and iconography are an example of the 
power of tradition and precedent in determining the types of capital that contribute 
to successful negotiation of the military social field. A reliance on stories and artifacts 
of the past emerged with great frequency in the data, suggesting that the actions of 
cadets’ forebears had a strong effect not only on the dispositions taken on by cadets, 
but also on the way in which their basic training was structured and delivered. 
You asked [about] my role models, I think that we get a lot of historical role models, 
we have ... Buildings named after specific officers and [in] freshman year, we're drilled 
on the history of the place, the history of these different war heroes, basically, and I 
think underline ideas that [say] “try and be like...” They don't say that, but why else 
would we study that stuff? (Male USAFA Three Degree cadet). 
The effect of “structure” in developing ideal air force officers is indelibly linked with 
the corresponding “structuring” nature of the habitus that develops during basic 
training. This interrelated nature of habitus – at once informed by structures while 
also informing those very structures itself – is critically important to understanding 
military cultures. It is the structuring aspect of habitus that can help explain the types 
of characteristics that tend to help a social agent accrue capital in the military field. 
An example that emerged frequently in the data was the notion of physical training 
standards. Physical Training, abbreviated to “PT” in some military circles, performs 
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a dual role in basic training. First, and most obviously, it serves to develop physical 
strength and endurance in cadets, ostensibly to prepare them for their operational 
roles following graduation. Second, pushing cadets to their physical limit serves as a 
process to build professionalism by developing self-discipline and tenacity. In many 
cases however, the instrumental purpose of PT is supplanted by its more unofficial 
role as a way of differentiating and categorising cadets. This happens both between 
cadets: 
I've been injured for a while, but my injury was ... I got one, and I got another. So it 
was one on top of the other. But I've had people who look at me in a weird way if I 
... Simply because I do not do the same testing as them, and do not do the same PT 
system as them, since I have to do rehab. And that makes you feel like an outsider. 
You can't be part of that group, or if you try to integrate yourself into that group, 
simply because you're not physically fit, you can't keep up with them (Female ADFA 
First Year cadet). 
But also by some staff: 
Yeah, it's a lot focused on ... The academic side of it is looked at "Ps [Passes, generally 
considered to be a mark of 50%] get degrees. You don't need the degree after this 
[after graduation from the academy]." However, as a logistics officer, I'm going to be 
dealing with contracts and […] I'm doing business. So obviously my degree matters. 
But it's kind of belittled a bit, like your DO for, say, passing a subject, you'll get a 
"Good job." And for a distinction you get a "Good job." And then they'll go, 
"However, you only did 10 pull ups. You need to work on that. You need to be able 
to do 20." And "Actually, no. I'm going to make you do 30." (Male ADFA First Year 
cadet). 
By emphasising physical fitness over other aspects of a cadet’s training, staff and 
cadets are contributing to the ongoing perpetuation of a set of “ideal” characteristics 
– individual elements of Bourdieusian capital – that, when amassed by an individual 
cadet, differentiate that cadet from others. Moreover, given the importance associated 
with certain characteristics (such as pull ups), embodiment of these elements seems 
to denote success in terms of negotiating the social space. At its most base, such a 
meritocracy resonates with the liberal foundations of UK, US and Australian society. 
But problems can arise if the types of capital necessary to excel in basic military 
training unnecessarily or arbitrarily privilege some over others, and evidence emerged 
at both USAFA and ADFA to suggest that it can be difficult for some members to 
reproduce or perform certain roles in order to build social capital. Women were 
particularly consistent in reporting the difficulty they faced in building viable capital: 
I know a lot of people who still have a problem with women being here. Not 
outwardly, and it’s not like anybody would walk up to you, a girl, and be like, “you 
don’t deserve to be here.” But, they just have different standards for women. I think 
that they’re judged a little bit more harshly in their leadership positions, because 
they’re either a pushover, or they’re, for lack of a better word – pardon my french – 
a bitch. And so I think it’s very rare that a female has the same leeway as a man might 
(Female USAFA First Degree cadet). 
[I]n my division, there's a strong competitive nature. We have a lot of ... Even the 
RAAF males are very ... like, and to their credit, they're very physically fit. And they 
are just as competitive as the Army and Navy. But quite a lot of the time, for a couple 
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of us girls, even, we get sort of put down for even just meeting the standard. It's like 
well ... you know, you don't put down someone who's passed in academics, just 
because they only just passed. Like it doesn't matter. If that's the minimum, and 
you've got that ... Like, I understand there's a difference between that and ... like, 
pushing people to improve is a whole ‘nother story. And like, I'm all for that. I'm for 
improvement and doing better […] But to be blatantly saying "You're not good 
enough." When you're told that you met the standard ... Like it seems to be a whole 
blurred line sort of thing (Female ADFA First Year cadet). 
As evident in the comments above, the emphasis on physical fitness, (particularly the 
capital accrued by performing activities requiring high levels of upper-body strength), 
at ADFA and USAFA has a structuring effect on the development of habitus during 
basic training. In this case, women are obliged to “fit” a particular template – 
regardless of its relevance to their career field – and, as articulated by the first cadet’s 
comments, face a double bind in which they are either assessed as too masculine, or 
not masculine enough. The apparently persistent inability of women to “fit” therefore 
reinforces the template in the “structuring” manner outlined by Bourdieu, resulting in a 
stubbornly enduring impression of women as unsuited to military service. Moreover, 
this addresses the second major question of which identities are inculcated and 
perpetuated in military basic training, and provides further insight into the reasons 
behind the inertia exhibited in military organisations facing direction and pressure to 
change their cultural norms. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that the modest success achieved by liberal democratic 
militaries in building inclusive and representative forces demonstrates a curious 
disjuncture between the values and norms of the polity with reference to the military. 
Following Morris Janowitz, I have argued that this is problematic if one is to assume 
that state institutions should represent the values of the government they serve. 
Unfortunately, the realm of military officer training, as with the military in general, 
has been quite successful in avoiding the eye of the critical sociologist. While there 
are undoubtedly systematic reasons for this, I have argued in this paper that a primary 
contributing factor is a general lack of social theory applied in many existing analyses. 
I have sought to address this oversight somewhat by applying Pierre Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice to the field of basic officer training in an effort to understand some 
of the processes and mechanisms that serve to insulate the military from broader 
society. Prior to unpacking Bourdieu’s theory, I suggested that the arena of basic 
military training represented a Goffmanian “total institution”; a social environment 
cut off from wider society through a variety of means. Goffman’s theory is thus a 
useful pathway to understanding the landscape of Bourdieu’s concept of social field 
as it applies to the military. More simply, Goffman can help us understand of the type 
of Bourdieusian field that exists in basic military training. From this starting point, the 
chapter harnessed data gathered from qualitative fieldwork to help underscore the 
applicability of Bourdieu’s theory to the military in general, and the field of basic 
training in particular. 
With respect to a second element of Bourdieu’s theory of practice, I presented some 
examples of the types of capital that are valued within the basic military training field. 
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Particularly evident from the data was the difficulty with which certain measureable 
minorities, such as women, are able to accrue the amount – and indeed the type – of 
capital that enables a successful negotiation of the social field of basic training. 
Building on the discussion of field and capital, this chapter presented the concept of 
air force basic military training as a period of socialisation in which a certain type of 
military habitus is developed. In common with the types of capital that are valued in 
the air force, I have suggested that an ideal military habitus contains characteristics 
that make it difficult for some groups to draw on the full toolbox of “transposable 
dispositions” and develop a “feel for the game” denoting full belonging in the military 
social field. In addition to providing a structural basis for the development of this 
habitus, I have suggested in this chapter that the apparent success (in negotiating the 
social field) of those embodying the ideal characteristics reinforces the primacy of the 
associated identity characteristics, re-affirming Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the 
habitus as both “structured” and “structuring”. 
The applicability of the theory of practice to the military makes Bourdieu’s absence 
from the realm of military sociology intriguing. As a theory that places great emphasis 
on structure and power imbalance, it seems clear that his work can be readily applied 
to the armed forces, thus it is surprising it has not been more widely deployed by 
military sociologists. Absent of space in this chapter to fully explore the utility of 
Bourdieu’s theory, it is hoped that the work here might provide some momentum for 
further research into an area that has, to date, remained regrettably tangential to the 
broader sociological field.   
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EDUCATING MILITARY ELITES: PROFESSIONAL MILITARY 
EDUCATION IN NATO COUNTRIES 
Thomas Crosbie, Edward R. Lucas and Nicolai E. Withander 
Abstract 
esearch on military affairs is experiencing a resurgence of interest both in the 
academy and in the popular press, particularly among sociologists. Alongside 
a shift toward conventional military concerns at the geopolitical level, we are 
witnessing a dramatic increase in the visibility of military elites in domestic and global 
politics. Most dramatically in the United States, but to lesser degrees also noted in 
Europe, military leaders occupy increasingly central and prominent political roles. 
This reflects a deeper transformation of the military organization, which globally has 
experienced quite dramatic structural transformations. While the role played by 
Professional Military Education (PME) in the rise of military elites has been 
overlooked by scholars, there are strong indicators to suggest that political leaders 
around the world are coming to recognize the strategic importance of PME as a tool 
of soft power, and indeed the world’s most powerful militaries are transforming their 
PME institutions into strategic assets. This chapter describes the ecology of NATO 
military education, drawing particularly from a close examination of the education of 
officers at two institutions, the U.S. Air Command and Staff College and the Royal 
Danish Defence College. By looking closely at how these two very different 
institutions teach their future leaders how to think about international and domestic 
politics, we take the first steps in developing a new comparative approach to the study 
of global patterns in military education.  
Keywords: professional military education, civil-military relations, international security 
4.1 Introduction 
Research on military affairs is experiencing a resurgence of interest both in the 
academy and in the popular press, particularly among sociologists (West & 
Matthewman, 2016). Alongside a shift toward conventional military concerns at the 
geopolitical level, we are witnessing a dramatic increase in the visibility of military 
elites in domestic and global politics. Most dramatically in the United States, but to 
lesser degrees also noted in Europe (Mérand & Barrette, 2013: see also Libel, 2016), 
military leaders occupy increasingly central and prominent political roles. This reflects 
a deeper transformation of the military organization, which globally has experienced 
quite dramatic structural transformations (King, 2011). While the role played by 
Professional Military Education (PME) in the rise of military elites has been 
overlooked by scholars, there are strong indicators to suggest that political leaders 
around the world are coming to recognize the strategic importance of PME as a tool 
of soft power (Atkinson, 2014). The world’s most powerful militaries are 
transforming their PME institutions into strategic assets (Ruby & Gibler, 2010; Van 
Oudenaren & Fisher, 2016). 
R 
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However, and despite broad European efforts to improve PME exchanges between 
nations following the Bologna Process,8 Paile (2010, 2011) and others offer 
compelling evidence that these processes have only scratched the surface. 
Accordingly, there remains a major gap in the literature: although we know that 
military elites matter more than ever, we know little about how they are taught to 
think. This book addresses the processes and practices in military education and 
training with the intention of helping to fill this gap in the literature. The present 
chapter aims at a more specific target by providing detailed examinations of two cases, 
the United States Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) at Maxwell Air Force Base, 
Alabama and the Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC), at Svanemøllen’s barracks 
in Copenhagen. By looking more deeply into the syllabi and readings of key 
instructional programs at these two institutions, we will provide a snapshot of how 
NATO officers in two “ideal types” of staff colleges are taught to think about 
politics.9 
In the first part of the chapter, we will make our case for the value of looking inside 
military education programs, arguing that this is of interest not only to scholars and 
military education professionals, but also to military professionals concerned with 
preparing for future conflicts. In the second part of the paper, we move through our 
two case studies, ACSC and RDDC, providing a detailed account of how officers at 
these two institutions are taught about politics. In the third section, we reflect on what 
the case studies suggest about the character of NATO officer education in the first 
decades of the twenty-first century. We conclude with a call for more sustained 
research on these timely topics. 
4.2 Educating NATO Officers 
To understand the impact of NATO officer education on cycles of war and peace, 
we must look beyond traditional academic disciplines, and instead work at linking 
insights from across sociology and political science. In approaching the topic through 
an interdisciplinary theoretical lens, we follow the path set out by Masland and 
Radway’s (2015 [1957]) groundbreaking Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and 
National Policy, the first major analysis of PME. Masland and Radway’s (2015 [1957]) 
guiding insight was that structural innovations in the field of PME were contributing 
to a new generation of military elite, which differed significantly from its predecessors. 
Janowitz (2017 [1960]) blended Masland and Radway’s (2015 [1957]) study of military 
education with earlier theoretical reflections on military elites (Lasswell, 1941; Mills, 
2000). He argued that a new model of managerial officer was replacing the heroic 
model of officership of an earlier generation. Ironically, although Janowitz’s study 
gave rise to the field of military sociology, later generations of scholars largely ignored 
the role of PME. More recently, sociologists have once again turned their attention 
to the importance of military leadership and the role of education (Allen, 2010; Snider 
                                              
8The Bologna Process is an intergovernmental endeavor initiated in 1999 by a group 29 countries 
intending to align and adopt a system of higher education. The Bologna Process established the 
European Higher Education Area (EHEA). The goal was to create a set of quality guidelines, ensuring 
enhancement of education and learning, as well as recognition of educational degrees across borders 
of these countries. As of 2018, 48 countries are part of the EHEA. (ehea.info, 2018) 
9 For a discussion of Weberian concept of ideal type, see Kim (2017).  
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& Matthews, 2005), echoing a dramatic increase in the US Department of Defense’s 
focus on professionalism (Crosbie & Kleykamp, 2018). 
This shift in the sociological literature has coincided with two developments in the 
political science literature. Civil-military relations scholars recognize that military 
leaders have much more political agency than Huntington (1957) theorized. At the 
same time, international relations scholars have increasingly focused on the state and 
individual levels (Chiozza & Goemans, 2011; Colgan & Lucas, 2017; Colgan & Weeks, 
2015; Moravcsik, 2000), moving away from the structural accounts that have long 
dominated the field (Keohane, 1984; Mearsheimer, 2003; Waltz, 1979). By employing 
this approach, studies have demonstrated that prior military service affects how 
political elites conduct foreign policy, including their willingness to use military force 
(Horowitz & Stam, 2014; Horowitz, Stam, & Ellis, 2015).  
As senior military officers take on larger roles in determining domestic and foreign 
policies — best exemplified by the first twelve-to-eighteen months of Donald 
Trump’s presidency — understanding how these elites form their views in domestic 
and international politics becomes increasingly central to understanding domestic and 
international politics more broadly. Research on military affairs is experiencing a 
resurgence of interest press (West & Matthewman, 2016). Most pressing in the Nordic 
context has been a renewed sense of the conventional-force threat posed by a 
revisionist Russian state (Richey, 2018). In such scenarios, military expertise is 
universally recognized as a key feature in the reassurance of allies and deterrence of 
regional forces. Alongside this shift toward conventional military concerns at the 
geopolitical level, we are witnessing a dramatic increase in the visibility of military 
elites in domestic politics. Most extreme has been the transformation of the American 
military, featuring mission creep and “new militarism” (Bacevich, 2013), so that 
“everything became war and the military became everything” (Brooks, 2017). This is 
why any suggestion of a global drift toward the American approach to educating 
military elites should be examined cautiously: although the American case is utterly 
unique in scale and geopolitical consequences, its organizational logic may well be 
scalable. 
While the role played by PME in the rise of military elites has been overlooked by 
scholars, there are strong indicators to suggest that political leaders around the world 
are coming to recognize the strategic importance of PME as a tool of soft power 
(Atkinson, 2014; Mujkic, Asencio & Byrne, 2018). The world’s most powerful 
militaries are transforming their PME institutions into strategic assets (Ruby & Gibler, 
2010; Van Oudenaren & Fisher, 2016). And while scholars are starting to call for 
increased exchanges between PME institutions (Paget, 2016), this has long been 
endorsed by the United States (Cope, 1995). Closer to home, the benefits of 
improving exchanges between Nordic PME institutions and limitations in the current 
system have been explored by several scholars (Graeger, 2007; Schaub, 2014). 
However, the major international efforts to organize PME exchange operate almost 
entirely as a means of exchanging training (the imparting of technical skills) rather 
than education (learning as such) (Johnson-Freese, 2013). Accordingly, there remains 
a major gap: we know that military elites matter more than ever, but know almost 
nothing about how they are taught to think. 
While political scientists and sociologists are increasingly recognizing that elites matter 
and elite education matters, the literature on PMEs remains disconnected from these 
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disciplines almost entirely (exceptions include Atkinson, 2014; Johnson-Freese & 
Kelley, 2017; Libel, 2016). Questions of military education have been most 
productively debated in the pages of Joint Force Quarterly, which is published by the 
United States National Defense University under the direction of the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Featuring contributions by retired and still-serving officers 
in addition to academics from both civilian and military educational institutions, 
debate in Joint Force Quarterly has consolidated around a handful of insights into PME 
that have relevance throughout NATO. 
Critical perspectives on PME abound in Joint Force Quarterly, with a consensus 
emerging that new and different approaches are needed if the quality of education is 
to meet the needs of military organizations. Ogden (2017) explores the obstacles to 
education erected by military careers, while Kuehn (2016) explores structural 
constraints, including the consequences of losing supporters in the legislature. What 
Ogden and Kuehn agree upon is that PME is not uniform – and is not easy. 
Many of the PME articles that have appeared in Joint Force Quarterly have focused 
specifically on the challenges of shifting from a tactical or operational mindset to the 
strategic or political level. Miller & Wackwitz (2015), for example, describe the 
transitional quality of an American officer’s final PME experience, a process intended 
to lead them from officer to “warrior scholar”. McCauley (2016) argues along similar 
lines that today’s military leaders face awesome challenges in managing complexity 
that demands very effective education. Allen and Filiberti (2016, p. 53) argue that 
“[s]enior leaders are not grown or educated overnight. And at the strategic level, 
pedestrian performances can have profound negative consequences” – nevertheless, 
they systematically reveal the bureaucratic pressures acting on policymakers, which 
continuously undermine support for education in the careers of senior officers. 
A final theme that has emerged in the literature and which relates to the concern with 
complexity is the growing recognition that interoperability is a critical military 
competency (Paget, 2016). A glance at recent military history will confirm the 
importance of clear and timely communication between military communities. The 
post-Cold War era has seen a parade of alliances, coalitions, and partnerships working 
together in unexpected configurations, from NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
1993, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Resolute Support in 
Afghanistan, EU-NATO cooperation in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa, 
or Operation Unified Protector in Libya 2011 – each of which has been marked by 
the need for militaries with few historical ties to work together seamlessly in highly 
complex settings. Multinational cooperation puts pressure on the interoperability of 
such partnerships, and thus emphasizes the requirement for more effective Command 
and Control (C2), agility, and understanding (Moro, Cicchi, & Coticchia, 2018). 
National differences in training, education, organizational culture, and doctrinal 
traditions abound. The increase in operational complexities as well as campaign scope 
underscores the need for a common metrics and a common language. Stavridis, 
Rokke, and Pierce (2016) point particularly to the need for standardized approaches 
to joint planning, lawful targeting, and strategic communication, in addition to more 
technical interoperability concerns with aerial refueling and the like. Effective 
education has the promise of enabling officers to identify and potentially fill the 
operational gaps that emerge across partner countries’ capabilities. 
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Our research is intended to help rectify problems in the existing research on PMEs, 
which are reflected in limitations in the theory, empirics, and comparative logic of the 
field. For the most part, PME has been undertheorized, serving as a black-box 
variable (Ruby & Gibler, 2010) rather than as a complex and variegated process. In 
terms of empirics, the handful of studies that have been published have drawn on 
data with very limited generalizability (Franke, 1999) or from personal and anecdotal 
data (Johnson-Freese, 2013). Finally, the theoretical and empirical limitations are 
reflected in the absence of guiding comparative logic. For nearly all of the published 
research on PME in the United States, the logic of comparison is between services 
(Shepherd & Horner, 2010). While Libel (2016) has broken ground with his 
comparative approach, his work remains limited by its focus on only a handful of 
European countries. Accordingly, while the research to date is imperfect, it does 
provide a useful foundation for a new wave of military education research, as 
evidenced throughout the present volume.  
4.3 Methods and Case Selection 
This chapter is a probe for a larger project, which aims to provide the first empirical 
baseline for NATO PME through detailed case studies of the entire population of 
military education programs in NATO. Our goal at present is to sketch professional 
military education in two settings (Maxwell AFB, USA and Copenhagen, Denmark). 
By doing so, we will provide an initial baseline for a comparative, case-oriented 
approach that can be scaled up through future research (Ragin, 1987, pp. 32–52). This 
section clarifies the logic of our research methods and case selection, and highlights 
the key considerations and potential pitfalls for researching officer education. 
Following the research process outlined by Rietjens, this chapter focuses on the data 
collection, reduction, and presentation phases of analysis (2014, p. 139). Employing 
this case-oriented comparative method of inquiry will allow us “to make meaningful 
comparisons of cases as wholes” (Ragin, 1987, p. 16). While the broader research 
project will study a wide array of variables, in this chapter, we focus our comparison 
on three key metrics: form of education (residence, hybrid, or online learning); focus 
of education (service-specific vs. joint); and hours of instruction, operationalized by 
number of hours students spend in lectures and seminars, both on campus and via 
online platforms (this is sometimes referred to as “contact hours”). These three 
variables provide an initial overview of the key differences and similarities between 
these PME programs, and will provide a foundation for further analysis. Together 
with these specific variables, we also provide a detailed description of the subject 
matter covered in each of the courses and programs examined.      
Because this chapter functions as a probe, our case selection demanded careful 
consideration. The challenge has been that even the simplest parameters for analysing 
this topic remain resolutely underdetermined. For example, simply answering the 
question of how many PME institutions exist in the NATO member states has proven 
unattainable. We derive our cases from a sample that has undergone three conceptual 
refinements: first, we distinguish between education and training; second, we separate 
the institutions into four tiers; and finally, we isolate mainline programs within 
institutions. 
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Contemporary research on PME is particularly indebted to Joan Johnson-Freese’s 
(2013) careful distinction of education (understood in the humanistic sense of learning 
as such) from training (understood as the guided acquisition of narrow or technical 
skills). In this sense, PME may be understood to fall under a larger umbrella of adult 
learning, and encompasses only those efforts by military organizations to teach their 
adult students (who are mostly but not entirely officers) how to think in abstract and 
theoretical terms about topics considered relevant to the knowledge base of an officer. 
This is not simply an analytic distinction, but rather maps onto internal logics within 
the global population of how militaries teach. By focusing on military education, we 
drop all institutions dedicated to military training, from military nursing colleges to 
flight schools to chaplain seminaries. Further, by focusing on professional military 
education (PME), we drop all instances of enlisted, non-commissioned officer and 
warrant officer education, and all cases of education primarily focusing on defence-
sector civilian employees (including, for example, paramilitary employees such as 
coast guard or gendarmerie). 
Let us briefly consider the global population of PME institutions, that is, institutions 
educating, not training, primarily officers. There is no reliable public data that 
comprehensively lists these institutions. To gain an overview of this population, we 
systematically searched through public records for all 193 sovereign states that were 
members of the United Nations as of 2018. This public data scrape yielded well over 
four hundred distinct institutions named in public records on the internet, from 
Afghanistan’s Marshal Fahim National Defence University to the Zimbabwe Military 
Academy. This population has a low confidence threshold, since many institutions 
lack an official web presence and there is a significant likelihood that many institutions 
are “not missing at random” (for example, some countries may prefer to hide details 
about their education of officers). 
Narrowing in on our particular interest, NATO PME, we find over sixty distinct 
institutions named in publicly accessible sources on the internet in the 29 NATO 
member states. In order to improve our confidence in both the accuracy of the 
institutions we have named and the information on missing data not being lacking, 
we submitted official Requests For Information through the network of Danish 
defence attachés for each member state. From this process, we have confirmed the 
accuracy of our data for twelve countries, although we withhold our full confidence 
in this assessment, as security considerations may lead officials to dissemble. 
Militaries educate their officers in a variety of settings for a variety of purposes, and 
so many different logics of categorization may be employed to give order to this 
diversity. One important distinction lies between single-service-based education and 
joint or whole-of-defence-based education. Equally justifiable would be to distinguish 
based on size of the state, size of the force, the basic organization of the force (all 
volunteer or conscript-based, for example), and any other number of distinctions. 
For our purposes, the most salient distinction, and the one that would provide us with 
the most intellectually valuable source of comparison, comes from career level. 
Regardless of context, junior officers around the world are charged with a set of 
responsibilities that resemble one another to a high degree, and differ in equal part 
from the responsibilities of senior officers. Junior officer education and senior officer 
education are thus appropriate categories of comparison across national contexts. We 
further refine this distinction by separating our population into four tiers of 
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education.10 At the bottom of the pyramid, militaries educate young adults to become 
officers, the pre-commissioning phase of PME. Next, militaries educate their young 
officers to occupy various command and staff positions. Some of these young officers 
will find success in their careers, and eventually (in many countries) they are educated 
to become leaders within the organization. Finally, in a small number of countries, 
these leaders are educated to become the leaders of the organization. 
To capture the full scale of PME in the twenty-first century, we have thus drawn ideal 
types for each of these four levels. The ideal types are (1) junior officer academy, (2) 
command and staff college, (3) war college, and (4) senior officer finishing school. 
This logic encompasses all but the final rank of a NATO officer career scale, from 
(pre-)commissioning (level 1, roughly NATO ranks OF-D, OF-1, and OF-2) to 
command and staff assignments (level 2, OF-3 and OF-4) to war college (level 3, OF-
5 and OF-6) to senior officer finishing school (level 4, OF-7 to OF-9). 
These have the benefit of mapping onto the actual system employed in the United 
States, where the ideal types can be compared to the real institutions quite directly. 
Thus, the United States Army has its Military Academy at West Point, New York 
(level 1); its Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (level 
2); and its War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (level 3). In the United 
States, “finishing” is done through the Joint Service CAPSTONE (for 1-stars) and 
PINNACLE (for 2- to 3-stars) programs (level 4), which are not separate institutions, 
but rather programs organized through the National Defense University (see Watson, 
2007, pp. 28, 39, 55). 
In order to compare across national contexts, we must remain alert to the diversity of 
educational pathways, and here, the United States is the outlier. Of the four levels that 
are clearly distinct in the American system, most countries in the world appear to have 
only the first two. NATO member states uniformly appear to have academies to 
educate their officers (with commissions sometimes awarded at entry and sometimes 
at departure) and command and staff colleges, but there are few war colleges and 
fewer senior officer finishing schools. This means that for many NATO officers, the 
education they receive in their command and staff college may well be the last time 
they receive a military education, even if they manage to become the four-star generals 
and admirals leading their services. 
While all four levels of PME have equal claims on our attention, level 2 (command 
and staff college) is significantly more standardized than the other three. At level 1, 
states differ dramatically in the role assigned to the military academy, and alternative 
pathways to education abound. While an elite cohort of American Army officers are 
educated at West Point, for example, many others take civilian degrees and become 
officers through the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps or Officer Candidate School. 
Likewise, many countries require their officers to receive civilian bachelor degrees and 
limit their academies to training roles. For these reasons, researching NATO 
education at the junior officer level is analytically challenging. PME at level 3 (war 
college) poses different challenges, since many countries lack war colleges altogether. 
Finally, because PME at level 4 (senior officer finishing school) prepares officers for 
                                              
10 Our four-tier approach draws inspiration from the U.S. Department of Defense’s method of 
organizing its Joint Education programs into JPME 1-4. 
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their very specific national contexts and because very few of these programs have any 
publically accessible records, effective research is not yet possible. 
As noted above, the American senior officer finishing schools are not “schools” in 
the traditional sense, but rather programs. This brings us to our final analytical 
distinction, between institutions and programs. A rich understanding of how officers 
are taught to think about politics (our goal) requires that we focus not at the level of 
institutions, but rather of military educational programs – that is, the particular 
pathways through which specified content is conveyed to students in a controlled 
setting. Educational programs are not perfectly nested within institutions: some 
institutions offer multiple programs, while some programs may cut across multiple 
institutions. While there are inevitably exceptions as individuals navigate through the 
education system in creative and unexpected ways, militaries do have standard 
pathways designed to control the quality of learning. These mainline educational 
pathways are of greatest value in comparing across cases. 
As researchers come to recognize the importance of PME to domestic and 
international politics and consequently to social life generally, the need for a sustained 
and informed dialogue becomes ever more obvious. Throughout this section of this 
chapter, we have made the case for how we think PME should be studied as a global 
phenomenon. First, we strictly distinguish between education and training, focusing 
our attention on how militaries teach their officers to think abstractly about political 
life. Second, military education can be analytically reconstructed as four stages, which 
map roughly onto the existing institutional landscape. Third, to unlock the actual 
learning processes, we need to look inside the curricula and syllabi of individual 
educational programs, rather than compare among institutions. The programs that 
most interest us are the mainline programs designed by military organizations to 
educate their officers at each critical career juncture, from pre-commissioning to 
command and staff assignments, war college, and senior officer finishing school. We 
propose that scholars focus specifically on the command and staff level, since this is 
the most tractable and provides the most readily comparable data. 
Finally, then, we can turn to our two cases. For this probe, we chose to focus on one 
American service command and staff college, the United States Air Command and 
Staff College (ACSC), and one European joint service college, the Royal Danish 
Defence College (Forsvarsakademiet) (RDDC). This comparison allows us to explore 
the mainline mid-career officer education at both a service-based college and a joint-
based college, asking basic questions about how American Air Force officers and 
Danish military officers are taught about politics. At the outset, it is not clear whether 
these two institutions are expected to teach politics in a similar way or not. On one 
hand, given the United States’ geostrategic position and given the way air power 
intersects with politics, we may expect ACSC students will be taught very differently 
from RDDC students. Further, the two countries differ dramatically in terms of 
political culture, demographic diversity, size, history, and many other important 
indicators. On the other hand, Denmark is a NATO member and close American 
ally, so we may expect some degree of commonality. In addition, and perhaps most 
importantly, Danish officers have excellent English-language skills. In the next 
section, we provide an overview of the relevant programs at these two institutions, 
and in the following section, some preliminary conclusions for our probe. 
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4.4 The Political Education of Officers at ASCS and RDDC 
In the following sections, we will outline the ACSC and RDDC curricula of 
international relations and strategy, thereby illustrating the similarities and differences 
in fundamental thought instilled in the students. 
US Air Command and Staff College 
ACSC is located physically and administratively within the Air University (AU), an 
umbrella organization which itself is located on the Maxwell Air Force Base in 
Montgomery, Alabama. Students who enroll in ACSC’s in-residence degree program 
live on campus for the ten-month degree program, and are required to attend seven 
mandatory courses as well as four electives. In the core curriculum, students study 
global politics primarily in the following courses: War Theory (Aug-Oct), 
International Security I (Nov-Dec) and International Security II (Jan-Mar). We 
examine the syllabi for these courses from the 2017-2018 (War Theory) and 2018-
2019 (International Security I and II) academic years. Figure 1 provides a graphical 
representation of the course progression.  
Figure 1: United States Air Command and Staff College Degree Plan (Source: 
airuniversity.af.edu/ACSC/Curriculum/#acsc-core-curriculum)  
War Theory. War Theory aims at preparing leaders and military professionals of the 
joint force to be “strategically minded, critical thinkers and skilled joint warfighters” 
(ACSC War Theory Syllabus, 2017, p. 3). Thus, at a time when the international 
security environment is highly complex and uncertain, it is the goal of the course to 
provide military professionals educational competences to develop their own “theory 
of war”, and prepare them intellectually for future armed conflicts (ACSC War Theory 
Syllabus, 2017, p. 4). The course is divided into three phases, employs an 
interdisciplinary approach to the study of war by integrating several scholarly 
disciplines, and carries a methodology that combines foundational theories of war 
with close analysis of historical and contemporary case studies. This allows students 
to understand the importance of adaptation and innovation, as well as how theory 
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and principles of war apply to the operational level of war across the range of military 
operations. Further, it expands students’ ability to think critically about war in general 
– beyond the level of tactics to that of policy, strategy, and operations – and to 
anticipate and recognize change in armed conflict, and communicate such 
understanding with clarity and precision (ACSC War Theory Syllabus, 2017, p. 3). In 
total, students in this course have 48 hours of instruction. 
The first phase of War Theory explores the nature of war, thus seeking to deepen 
students’ understanding of war as political, social, and cultural phenomena, with its 
own inherent and fundamental purpose and logic (ACSC War Theory Syllabus, 2017, 
p. 3). Students are introduced to the works of classical military theorists as a way of 
grasping the underlying purpose, role, and function of armed forces. Here, politics is 
introduced through close readings of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu in particular, with 
Clausewitz representing war as “direct” politics and Sun Tzu representing war as 
“indirect” politics. The second phase of War Theory deals with the question of how 
war and military thought, in other words, theory and principles of war, have evolved 
across the military domains over the last two centuries. This phase begins with three 
days’ studying the land, maritime, and air domains, and a further three days’ studying 
each of the three offsets (nuclear, precision-guidance, and information 
predominance). Students are exposed to the land domain through the lens of 
positional warfare and movement, to the maritime domain through the lens of sea 
command, and finally, the air domain through the lens of the strategic airpower 
debate. The three offsets are presented in an evolving history of American thinkers 
adapting new technologies to ensure military superiority over near-peer adversaries. 
The final phase of the course is quite short, with just two meeting days in which the 
students discuss the new wars debate and the challenges of strategic uncertainty. The 
politics theme is reintroduced in the final readings, particular in selections of Emile 
Simpson’s War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics. The syllabus 
glosses Simpson as arguing “contemporary armed conflict has blurred the distinction 
[between] military activity and politics. As you read, consider the implications of his 
argument for future armed conflicts” (ACSC War Theory Syllabus, 2017, p. 37).  
International Security I. International Security I provides the foundations for 
understanding the international system of states. The course presents three 
overarching theories from which to build: Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism11 
(ACSC International Security 1 Syllabus, 2018, p. 5). These theories and their core 
concepts are all part and parcel of prompting thoughtful reflection of the power 
symmetry – or lack thereof – at the grand strategic and military perspective, which is 
the subject of the course. This understanding allows decision-makers at the tactical 
and operational levels of war to understand and amalgamate the multiple levels in the 
context of the international environment. It is thus a course that drives students to 
think critically on the underlying assertions about the international system, which 
continuously drive US grand strategy. Throughout the course, the students will apply 
these theoretical frameworks on different analytical cases. The course draws liberally 
from philosophy, political science, history, and security studies (ACSC International 
Security 1 Syllabus, 2018, p. 5).  
                                              
11 To gain a greater insight in these theories, see Jackson and Sørensen (2007).  
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As with War Theory, International Security I consists of three phases, each covering 
a 5-day period. The themes are: 1) the geopolitical environment, 2) the unipolar 
moment, opportunities, and challenges, and 3) emerging multipolarity and 21st century 
security issues. The initial phase covers the theories and foundations of realism, 
liberalism, constructivism, international order, and US foreign policy and grand 
strategy. The second phase covers globalization, nationalism, human security, WMD 
proliferations, and the cyber domain. The final phase covers Iran and North Korea, 
China, Russia, violent extremist organizations, and strategic surprise. All elements are 
anchored in a broader framing of the overarching theoretical foundations of 
international relations, in other words, realism, liberalism and constructivism (ACSC 
International Security 1 Syllabus, 2018, pp. 4–5). In total, students in this course have 
48 hours of instruction. 
Phase 1 focuses on the development of the understanding of the theories and placing 
them in an international context. Specifically, it delves into the setting of the power 
and capabilities in the anarchical system, meaning security, and how states pursue 
security through the framework of the three traditions. This phase uses primarily the 
Cold War and the example of the great power interactions – in other words, grand 
strategy – which is the focus of the first phase (ACSC International Security 1 
Syllabus, 2018, pp. 4–5). The second phase expands on the great power struggle, 
exemplified through the use of the case of the Cold War and dives into the aspect of 
globalization and nationalism in the context of the international system. Here, the 
focus is on their underlying drivers. Again, the worldview is US-centric, and concerns 
itself with what is, essentially, the grand strategic response to emerging globalization 
(ACSC International Security 1 Syllabus, 2018, p. 5). The third phase focuses on the 
emerging powers and the emergence of the multipolar world. Again, the focus is on 
how to understand this in the setting of the international system, and through the lens 
of the different theoretical frameworks of the theories of international politics (ACSC 
International Security 1 Syllabus, 2018, p. 5). 
International Security II. The course International Security II builds on the first 
course, by delving into deeper understanding of military strategy, and strategic 
employment of the US military in relationship to its capabilities and limitations. In 
this course, the goal is to understand what strategy is, and how US military strategy in 
the context of achieving national security interests can be employed. This is done by 
splitting the course into three distinct phases, which all tie into what military strategy 
is, and how to understand it in different contexts. The course introduces students to 
specific theoretical strategic concepts, applies these concepts to various cases, and 
thereby invites students to evaluate the validity and utility of these strategic concepts 
(ACSC International Security 2 Syllabus, 2018, pp. 4–5). In total, students in this 
course have 48 hours of instruction. 
Phase I examines decision-making by focusing on the nexus of “political-military 
integration and strategic outcomes” (ACSC International Security 2 Syllabus, 2018, p. 
4). Phase II builds on phase I, by integrating into the equation of military strategy the 
factors that shape strategic assessment, adaptation, and decision-making during 
wartime. Adding this element allows the student to understand the unknowns, the 
cognitive and psychological biases, and the process of conducting civilian military 
relations under fire. It adds in factors that affect the strategy and the ability to 
formulate it, thus reinforcing students’ understanding that military strategy does not 
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happen in a vacuum (ACSC International Security 2 Syllabus, 2018, pp. 4–5). Phase 
III concentrates its efforts around taking into account the point of view of the 
Department of Defense’s Geographic Combatant Commands (Africa Command, 
Central Command, European Command, Indo-Pacific Command, Northern 
Command, and Southern Command). Students are introduced to the military-
strategic objectives, capabilities, and limitations of command, and encouraged to 
reflect on the reciprocity between military actions and political objectives. This is done 
through a series of case studies intended to foster critical thinking (ACSC 
International Security 2 Syllabus, 2018, p. 5). 
Royal Danish Defence College 
American officers typically attend their own service’s command and staff college, 
although many do elect to attend another service’s college and some attend the Joint 
Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. By contrast, Denmark has consolidated its 
PME in a single institution, the Royal Danish Defence College, which includes both 
PME level 1 within separate military academies that also serve as internal 
administrative units, and a joint service degree program (the Master of Military 
Studies), which serves as the de facto command and staff college.12 Unlike ACSC, all 
Danish advanced military education is undertaken through blended learning, meaning 
a mix of both resident and distance learning, and the students remain employed in 
their regular military “day jobs” throughout their studies. (RDDC homepage: 
Uddannelsens formål og indhold). 
Figure 2: Royal Danish Defence College Degree Plan (Source: fak.dk/uddannelse/ 
mms/indhold/opbygning/Pages/default.aspx) 
                                              
12 The Royal Danish Defence College (Forsvarsakademiet) includes the three service-based Danish 
military academies (Hærens Officersskole, Søværnets Officersskole and Flyvevåbnets Officersskole), although the 
army academy is physically located nearby at Frederiksberg Palace.  
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Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the course progression in Danish. The 
left scale is number of European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) points per course, 
and the right scale is time (“three years”). Near the bottom of the figure, three courses, 
Military Leadership, Military Strategy and Military Operations, are listed as mandatory 
(alle moduler er obligatoriske). Above these are six courses from which students must 
choose one per topic (Military Leadership Advanced A and B, Military Strategy 
Advanced A and B, and Military Operations Advanced A and B). Next, students 
choose from a range of FLEX modules (elective courses), and finally, they must 
complete a thesis (Masterprojekt) on a topic of their choice. Whereas the mandatory 
courses on leadership and operations may touch on political questions, the heart of 
political education for Danish officers comes from the three Military Strategy courses, 
of which all students must do at least two. Notably, war theory (represented on the 
figure as militærhistorie) is an elective. (RDDC homepage: Opbygning) 
Basic Military Strategy. The RDDC’s Basic Military Strategy course is a required 
part of the Master of Military Studies program. The course investigates how the use 
of military power correlates with the state’s strategic objectives and how the military 
interacts with the other instruments of state power in the pursuit of national security 
interests. This is intended to enable students to comprehend the strategic relationship 
between ends, ways, and means; understand the international political frameworks 
and context in which the planning and execution of military operations is entrenched; 
and finally, comprehend and contribute to the formation of political directives relating 
to planning and execution of military operations (RDDC Basic Military Strategy 
Syllabus, 2018, p. 1). In total, students in this course have 66 hours of instruction. 
The course has three residence periods of about three days each, interspersed with 
distance learning tasks. In the first residence period, students are introduced to the 
purpose, role, function, and constituent elements of strategy, and then discuss how 
strategy is anchored in the political sphere (RDDC Basic Military Strategy Syllabus, 
2018, p. 5). The second residence period focuses on the how strategy can be employed 
in responding to what are now termed “hybrid threats”, where an opponent uses both 
military and non-military instruments to multiply effects. The point of departure here 
is on Russia-backed hybrid threats and how Denmark can respond in such cases, with 
particular attention paid to the cooperation between military and non-military 
agencies (RDDC Basic Military Strategy Syllabus, 2018, p. 5). The third residence 
period examines cases where Denmark has been directly involved in armed conflict.  
Military Strategy, Advanced A: Military Strategy and International Conflicts. 
While all Danish military Master students are required to take Basic Military Strategy, 
they have a choice of which advanced strategy course they will take. Some students 
may take both advanced strategy courses, using one to satisfy the requirement and the 
second as an elective. The first advanced course focuses on interstate conflict. 
Building on the Basic course, this seeks to further students’ understanding of 
international politics, strategic theory, and international law, giving the student the 
skills necessary to analyze and advise on military strategy at the international level 
(RDDC homepage: Militær Strategi, Basic module). In total, students in this course 
have 54 hours of instruction. 
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The interstate conflict course has three residence modules. The first introduces 
students to classical international relations theories and also acts as a summary of 
Basic Military Strategy. Students are then guided through a typology of international 
conflicts, exploring the causes of conflict, and are briefly introduced to topics in 
international law. The second module focuses on the South China Sea for an extended 
case study, exploring the main actors’ military strategy, methods, actions, framework 
conditions, and international law. The third module looks at emerging military-
strategic developments. The focus is on the Baltic Sea and the Arctic as possible sites 
of competition between Russia and NATO, although other cases are also considered. 
Students are prompted to reflect on what options a country like Denmark may have 
in each of the possible strategic engagements on the horizon (RDDC Advanced 
Military Strategy A Syllabus, 2018, pp. 1–4).  
Military Strategy, Advanced B: Military Strategy and Intrastate Conflicts. 
Where the first advanced course focuses on interstate conflict, the second focuses on 
intrastate conflict. Particular attention is paid to conflict resolution, how conflicts 
emerge, and what military, strategic, and social science theories might explain and 
supply solutions to the different drivers of internal conflict, such as armed rebellion, 
insurgency, terrorism, civil war, and more. The course draws extensively from social 
science literature in the attempt to give explanations and solutions to the ongoing 
internal challenges that multiple collapsed, failed, and near-failing states suffer from. 
The course is centered around four residence periods, each with its own focus 
(RDDC Advanced Military Strategy B Syllabus, 2019, p. 4). In total, students in this 
course have 59 hours of instruction. 
The first of the four modules is focused on the causes, background, and handling of 
intrastate conflicts. Students are invited to consider how conflicts emerge, what drives 
conflict, who the stakeholders in a conflict are, what are their motivation and goals, 
and what is the character of such conflicts. This draws from sociology, economic 
theory, and international relations theory. The period revolves around the institutions 
and power-dynamics – or lack thereof – in Syria and Iraq, coupled with external 
stakeholders’ motivations, goals, and actions (RDDC Advanced Military Strategy B 
Syllabus, 2019, pp. 4–5). The second module delves into the different strategies that 
militaries might employ in the attempt to resolve such a conflict. These include 
different forms of counterinsurgency, host nation support, foreign internal defense, 
and more. This presence period takes a strategic perspective of the conflict (RDDC 
Advanced Military Strategy B Syllabus, 2019, pp. 4, 6). The third module discusses the 
options regarding international law, considering what options and limitations there 
are regarding the employment of different strategic tools for various types of 
intrastate conflict (Advanced Military Strategy B Syllabus, 2019, pp. 4, 7). The fourth 
and last of the modules shifts to consider the operational options of the case 
scenarios, focused on the use of special forces. Students are given examples from 
mission deployment, to allow them to reflect on how special forces may be employed 
successfully in intrastate conflicts (RDDC Advanced Military Strategy B Syllabus, 
2019, pp. 4, 7–8). 
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Table 1: Sum up of findings 
 Form of 
education* 
Focus of 
education** 
Geopolitical 
Outlook 
Hours of 
instructions*** 
Air Command and 
Staff College (ACSC) 
Residential 
Service 
specific 
National 
(US) 
48 hours per 
course 
Royal Danish 
Defence College 
(RDDC) 
Hybrid Joint 
International 
(NATO) 
54 – 66 hours 
per course 
Note: * Residence, hybrid or online, ** Service specific or joint, *** Contact hours per course 
 
As we can see in Table 1, despite their many similarities, the ACSC and RDDC 
curricula do differ in certain important respects. ACSC is a residential program; 
RDDC’s program is hybrid, with students expected to do much of their learning 
outside the classroom. The focus of the ACSC program is service-specific, in this case 
oriented around the Air Force and concepts of air power. The RDDC program is 
joint, with equal time given to land, maritime, and air power concepts. The ACSC 
program expresses an American national outlook, while the RDDC program is 
international, rather than Danish, in its outlook. While the ACSC courses take place 
residentially over a period of 48 contact hours each, the hybrid-learning RDDC 
program entails many contact hours over a short period.   
4.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
This chapter compares officer education at the United States Air Command and Staff 
College and the Royal Danish Defence College. What did we discover through this 
comparison? First, it is important to note two major structural differences. The 
American program is a residential program and therefore it demands much more of 
students’ time than the Danish program. In addition, the Danish college is a joint 
service college, and therefore introduces students to topics from land, maritime, and 
air perspectives, while the American case is, of course, a service college, and 
unsurprisingly offers a much more air-centric curriculum. Nevertheless, both offer 
comparable introductions to international security, covering similar themes and 
drawing upon many of the same authors. Indeed, we find the similarities between the 
programs to be more compelling than the differences. 
This chapter serves as an introduction and probe. We introduce a problem that we 
believe should concern the social and political sciences broadly, namely, the absence 
of good data on how military officers are taught to think about politics. We argue that 
this is indeed a problem, given the expanding role of high-ranking officers on the 
world stage. We conclude from the theoretical framing that there is an urgent need 
for a new empirical baseline for NATO professional military education, understood 
as a global phenomenon with a huge amount of diversity. As a probe, we present here 
a simplified account of two cases. Our research question asks how NATO officers 
are educated to think about politics. From these preliminary cases, we infer that 
different institutions, unsurprisingly, have different perspectives, and that these map 
onto their broader institutional affiliations and national perspectives. These officers 
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are taught along standard academic lines, and are presented perspectives that may be 
joint or single-service-oriented, and nationally or internationally focused. This is, 
however, only the initial probe into a broader comparative logic of educating military 
elites. 
The logic of comparison is, in our view, of equal value to the specifics of what we 
have found in these cases. To compare across something as diverse as military 
education, it is necessary to find ways to make the data tractable. To that end, we 
understand our research topic as adult learning conducted within military 
organizations. We narrow our field by focusing only on the education (understood in 
its narrow sense) of professional officers, leaving aside the role of military training. 
Further, we divide PME into four levels, and argue for the benefits of this initial phase 
of research focusing on the command and staff college level (the education of captains 
and majors). Finally, we argue that scholars of PME need to look under the hood, so 
to speak, by analyzing the specific content of programs of study, rather than the 
organizations and institutions housing those programs. 
At the United States Air Command and Staff College and at the Royal Danish 
Defence College, international politics is framed through the lens of basic academic 
international relations theories. These theories are then used to make sense of cases 
of historical and contemporary conflicts. For the ACSC students, significant stress is 
placed on Clausewitz’s insight that war is fundamentally political, although from the 
syllabi, it appears that this focus on politics tends to recede as the students look more 
deeply into how American military thinkers have theorized the battlespace in the past. 
ACSC students walk away from an intensive, 11-month-long residential degree having 
been exposed to the role of politics in land, maritime, and air domains, and with 
familiarity with the US Geographic Combatant Commands and emerging strategic 
challenges. Students at the RDDC are given more or less the same scholarly 
foundation, but have much less time for the courses. Their education focuses richly 
on a handful of highly salient case studies. It is important to note that where the 
American students are taught broadly about possible American responsibilities in the 
global security environment, Danish students are taught about a narrower spectrum 
of cases, but with the additional focus on not only their own national role, but also 
the American and NATO alliance roles in each case. The differences between the 
programs, tabulated in Table 1, reflect what we expect to be a typical range of 
variations, but what is more striking is the deep intellectual commonalities in these 
two cases. It remains to be seen how much variance exists in the total population.  
The chapters of this book address a topic that is at once extremely relevant for both 
political and social scientists broadly, and also largely uncharted. There are many 
unknown unknowns. The literature thus far, which we have argued has been built on 
weak empirical foundations, propagates the belief that many PME programs are 
plagued by a vicious circle. The logic here is that militaries incentivize operational 
roles and discourage talented officers from returning to teach the next generation of 
leaders. This may (or may not) lead to a cycle of poor officers being assigned to 
teaching roles, and doing that job poorly as well, with generation after generation of 
officers benefitting less and less from their education. Thus, we have spirited critiques 
of PME ranging from Johnson-Freese (2012) to Cancian (2016) to Ogden (2017) and 
beyond. 
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Our aim in this chapter is constructive. We encourage commenters and policymakers 
alike to think comparatively and explore the range of options before drawing their 
own conclusions. As a final point of consideration, the global academic job market is 
today marked both by dramatic oversupply of PhDs (“They called my university a 
PhD factory”, 2018) and by declining numbers of traditional tenured jobs (Heffernan, 
2017). This may be the place to look for a structural solution, a supply of permanent 
staff educated in how to educate and able to teach from a research perspective.    
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5 
TRAINING FOR RETURNING – PEACEKEEPERS’ HOMECOM-
ING EXPERIENCES13 
Ulla Anttila 
Abstract 
omecoming and change management after it may be more challenging than 
leaving for a deployment in an international crisis management operation. 
This article focuses on the thoughts of three Finnish focus groups, which 
have experience of homecoming from military crisis management operations. The 
interviewed focus groups were recently returned peacekeepers, volunteers for 
peacekeepers telephone support hotline and a group of disabled peacekeepers. 
The results of the study are interpreted in the context of understanding the change 
management, which returning peacekeepers go through. The results are analysed in 
the context of action competence and resilience in terms of developing military 
training, education and psychosocial support practices. This article focuses on how 
the training of the peacekeepers could be developed in order to support peacekeepers’ 
homecoming and change management related to it. Peer support, familial issues and 
psychosocial support are also discussed due to their importance to peacekeepers. 
In accordance with the results of the study, the follow-up of Finnish veteran 
peacekeepers’ wellbeing and arrangements for their training after homecoming could 
be developed in order to enhance post-operational change management. Such 
recommended follow-up and training procedures could also be studied in order to get 
data, how to develop further the follow-up and training for veteran peacekeepers. 
Besides, the wider question of developing the education of the military and training 
procedures for peacekeepers prior to and during the operation are assessed at a more 
general level. Even though the deployment in military crisis management does not 
usually lead to severe mental problems, it may still have a strong impact on an 
individual after the operation. More elaboration of these questions is also needed in 
different curricula for the education of soldiers and officers.   
Keywords: peacekeepers, veterans, homecoming, training, change management 
                                              
13 This chapter underwent a double-blind peer review process in which the two reviewers were 
academics with specific expertise in the given field. Manuscript was accepted based on editors’ and 
reviewers’ consideration of revisions. 
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5.1 Introduction  
Armed conflicts, peacekeeping and military crisis management 
After the era of Cold War, peacekeeping and peace support operations have become 
more robust and complex and they often consist of higher risks (Curran 2013). 
Contemporary wars typically “take place in the context f the disintegration of states”, 
and violence is mostly targeted against civilians. Often the distinction between private 
and public is far from clear in warfare, which complicates the situation. (Kaldor 2007, 
pp. 3–5.) 
Riskier operations are also more challenging for the personnel involved. Especially 
since the 1990s the United Nations and the international community have focused on 
the questions, how to provide protection to the victims of the armed conflicts. 
Peacekeeping activities and support to peace operations have been developed. 
According to Mac Ginty, Joshi and Lee (2019), UN peacekeeping, which supports a 
liberal peace accord, positively affects the duration of peace.  
Changes in armed conflicts and conflict management also challenge how the training 
of the peacekeepers should be carried out. Besides military training, also training to 
promote negotiation and conflict resolution skills of the peacekeepers has been 
emphasized (Curran, 2013). Regarding UN peace operations, it has been found 
important to strengthen training programmes’ ability to get trained personnel also be 
deployed in UN missions (Solli et al., 2011). 
Finnish peacekeepers have been deployed since 1956, and approximately 55.000 
deployments with 50.000 individual peacekeepers from Finland have taken place. 
Nowadays, Finland contributes to nine missions, of which UNIFIL in Lebanon is the 
largest one. (Finnish Defence Forces, 2018; Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
2018a and 2018b; Holma, 2018.) Due to the changes in armed conflicts and especially 
their management in the context of the EU and NATO peace operations, Finland 
renewed the law and changed the name of the legislation in 2006 (Finlex, 2019; 
Palosaari, 2013). 
Action competence 
Action competence refers to a holistic approach to human beings, and it underlines 
inseparable physical, psychological, social and ethical dimensions of each of us to be 
able to act and react in purposeful ways. This holistic perspective is useful in the 
world, in which individuals may need to change their identities. (Toiskallio, 2009, pp. 
48–50.) Action competence has been widely used as defined by Jarmo Toiskallio 
(2009) in military pedagogy in Finland, and therefore, it is also well known as a 
concept among the military in Finland. Due to its wide applications in military 
pedagogy, action competence is a useful concept for developing practices and policies 
to enhance peacekeepers’ wellbeing.  
Jarmo Toiskallio has enlarged a more traditional view of action competence with an 
ethical dimension. This enlargement is especially relevant regarding soldiers’ work 
because they have a mandate to use armed force in their duties, which require taking 
responsibility. As Jarmo Toiskallio (2017) defines it, responsibility is at the core of the 
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ethical competence. Schok et al’s (2007) finding that “construing positive meaning 
from war and peacekeeping experiences, especially related to combat exposure or high 
perceived threat, is associated with better psychological adjustment” can be 
interpreted in terms of action competence. Finding meaning of the operation may be 
crucial fir finding a personal balance in ethical and psychological terms after returning 
home from an operation. Prior to, during and after peacekeeping or military crisis 
management operations, action competence is a relevant concept in relation for 
understanding the wellbeing of peacekeepers and any challenges to it.  
Change management and resilience 
Homecoming from an operation may be more challenging for a soldier than leaving 
home for a deployment in military crisis management (Anttila, 2012). Therefore, it is 
important to understand, what kind of dynamics these changes from home to the 
operation and from the operation back home include. As work, military crisis 
management and peacekeeping duties include both higher risks and moving away 
from one’s home country. These changes may be much more intensive than, for 
example, working in military duties which do not require a deployment in a higher-
risk environment in another country.  
Potentially traumatizing events’ impact on soldiers and peacekeepers has been 
studied. Much research has focused on severe symptoms caused by being deployed 
in the battlefield or in peacekeeping operations with higher risks. However, in the 
aftermath of Vietnam war more research focused on soldiers’ reactions after traumatic 
events, and the diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has existed only 
since 1980 (Seligman, 2013, p. 155; Poijula et al., 2015). In studies with broader than 
a military focus, the emergence of PTSD has been found affected by a multitude of 
factors, including gender, cultural factors and age (Nolen-Hoeksama et al., 2014, pp. 
485–491). In the research focusing on Finnish peacekeepers, however, the risk for 
post-traumatic stress disorder has been found low (Kaikkonen & Laukkala, 2016).  
Traumatic experiences do not necessarily cause posttraumatic stress disorder. There 
is also an option of posttraumatic growth, which means that a traumatic experience 
contributes to posttraumatic growth instead of posttraumatic stress disorder 
(Seligman, 2013). Through training it is possible to provide tools for supporting 
posttraumatic growth in advance to or during the deployment. Because it is 
impossible to predict who face potentially traumatizing events during the 
peacekeeping operation, supportive education and training should be provided to all 
the soldiers. 
Regarding homecoming and the period after it, less attention has been paid to the 
personnel in less risky operations, long-term impact of the operations as well as 
women peacekeepers’ homecoming and coping (Brounéus, 2014). However, both 
riskier and less risky operations signify changes for the deployed personnel, and it is 
important to understand the meanings of the changes in relation to different types of 
operational environments. Talking about passed experiences in peacekeeping 
operations has been found beneficial for peacekeeping veterans (Greenberg et al., 
2003). 
Handling the changes after homecoming from a military crisis management or a 
peacekeeping operation is defined as change management in this article. In the 
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psychological framework, resilience signifies a ”competence or positive and effective 
coping in response to risk or adversity” (Mayordomo et al., 2016). Change 
management can be identified as part of resilience and action competence. A resilient 
person can handle his or her resources adequately even when having noticeable 
symptoms due to the adversity (Southwick & Charney, 2018). Change management 
can also be analysed in the framework of psychological, social, physical and ethical 
action competence. It is related to psychological action competence, but it may also 
be related to its social and physical action competence and to a certain extent also to 
ethical action competence.   
Family resilience 
Recently more research has focused on military families and their resilience. Further 
research on the topic of family resilience in military families is needed. However, for 
example, a deployment’s impact on the children of military families appears to be 
mediated by parental reactions including their wellbeing, stress and psychopathology 
both on behalf of the parents, who are deployed or who stay at home with the children 
(Palmer, 2008; Paley et al., 2013). The partners of the peacekeepers, who suffer from 
PTSD, have a higher risk of getting psychological symptoms than the partners of 
peacekeepers who do not suffer from PTSD (Dirkwager et al., 2005). Familial issues, 
including support from the family, affect peacekeepers’ motivation as well as how 
motivated they are to be deployed in later operations (Tomforde, 2005).  
In Finland, peacekeepers’ families’ reactions during or after the operation have not 
been extensively studied, which can be seen as a deficit of knowledge concerning 
understanding the impact of peacekeeping service. Family members have been found 
to be affected by a peacekeeping deployment, but the peacekeepers in the study had 
not been affected by PTSD, and therefore the impact on the families has not been 
found large either (Kallionalusta, 2010). 
Developing training and education by learning from the experiences from the 
field 
Resilience training and education have been developed for the military context in 
order to strengthen psychological resilience, facilitate soldiers’ adaptation and to 
prevent post-traumatic stress disorder. Resilience training consists of different 
components including understanding the relations between an adversity, its emotional 
consequences and beliefs related to the adversity. One consequence of the training is 
a better understanding of the fact, that emotions are not derived from an adversity 
but are rather an outcome of an individual’s interpretation of it. (Seligman, 2013, pp. 
152–181.)    
In Finland, the training and education of a peacekeeper takes place after military 
service, which is based on the conscription of male citizens. A peacekeeper’s training 
consists of the following phases: preliminary training, basic training, complementary 
training and post-operational training, of which the preliminary training is planned to 
be part of the education for the peacekeepers, who work in demanding duties (Finnish 
Defence Forces, 2019a; 2019b). A peacekeeper’s potential psychological difficulties 
after returning are described in the Peacekeeper’s Guide, which is an information 
booklet for peacekeepers and their families (see Finnish Defence Forces, 2019b).  
  
65 
In the Finnish context, questions related to homecoming, are handled in the education 
and training of soldiers, but it is, however, relevant to ask, whether there has still been 
sufficiently training and education concerning the topic. In the training prior to the 
operation, psychosocial support to the peacekeepers and the legislation, on which the 
services are based, are introduced (Ryhänen, 2019). The official guide, which is 
distributed to all the recruited peacekeepers, their families and close relations, also 
contains guidance related to peacekeepers’ wellbeing and homecoming. Potential 
challenges after homecoming are not a prioritized theme in these trainings prior to 
the operation, but the various questions related to the homecoming are in the 
programme of the post-operational training. 
Finnish soldiers who are deployed to military crisis management duties, attend at least 
in the preoperational and one post-operational training. A post-operational survey for 
the returned peacekeepers is also carried out concerning every veteran (Finnish 
Defence Forces, 2019b). In Finland, training for peacekeeping is only part of the 
soldiers’ training, while for example in Denmark, crisis management training plays a 
major role in soldiers’ training (Oikarinen, 2014). These differences are dependent on 
the priorities in the defence policy. 
Peacekeepers’ decisions to be recruited and how they motivate the recruitment to the 
operation to their families are dependent on the information, which they receive prior 
to the operation (Nybo, 2016). In 2015 approximately, one third of the peacekeepers 
were recruited from the personnel working for the armed forces on a regular basis. 
On the other hand, a majority of Finnish professional soldiers have been found 
unwilling to serve in crisis management. (Niemelä, 2016.) 
Methods based on Stress Exposure Training have been found successful in the 
training for military crisis management (Vähä-Mäkilä, 2013). There is potential for 
stress reduction training, because it may be useful for peacekeepers due to the 
practical techniques of stress control and of one’s awareness on one’s reaction to 
stress. 
5.2 Material and method 
When developing practical solutions to improve training and education of the crisis 
management personnel, it is important to understand former peacekeepers’ 
experiences. Therefore, in this research, the interviewees are seen as experts, who, 
through telling about their experience, can help understand how policies on 
homecoming and especially on training can be improved in order to facilitate the lives 
of peacekeeping veterans. Traditionally, Finland has deployed a large proportion of 
its troops for peacekeeping duties from the reserves, and therefore, this research 
elaborates largely their perspectives on homecoming. The research question for this 
research article is defined as follows:  
How could peacekeepers’ training be developed in order to support peacekeepers’ 
homecoming and to provide the best forms of psychosocial support? 
In Chapter 5.1, the theoretical background of the article has been introduced, and the 
material and methods are presented in Chapter 5.2. The results are documented first 
(5.3) in accordance with the focus groups of the study. The results from the three 
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focus groups are analysed later in this chapter also by comparing the results from 
different focus groups. The results are finally analysed in the context of military 
education and peacekeepers’ training and the recommendations for further research 
in the Discussion of the article in Chapter 5.4. 
Three focus groups and the specific features of the research procedure are introduced 
in Table 1 below. All the interviewees were Finnish, and they were informed about 
the and the background of the study. The interviews and surveys were carried out in 
2018. 
Table 1. Research Procedure and focus groups of the Study 
 
Recently returned 
peacekeepers 
Volunteers in the 
telephone support 
hotline  
Disabled 
peacekeeping 
veterans 
N N=13  
N=10 (survey); N=4 
(group interview) 
N=4 
Features of the 
focus groups 
Returning no more 
than three years 
ago (with one 
exception).  
Experienced with 
volunteering in the 
telephone support 
hotline for 
peacekeepers, 
peacekeeping 
veterans and their 
families. 
Disability or other 
health problem that 
had started during 
or after 
homecoming. 
Research 
procedure 
1. Two focused 
interviews 2. A 
writing activity called 
"a letter from the 
future" between the 
interviews 3. A 
survey questionnaire 
with complementary 
questions 
1. A survey 
questionnaire to all 
the volunteers in the 
telephone support 
hotline 2. A group 
interview 3. An 
opportunity to 
comment on a 
summary of the 
interview and a 
complementary 
questionnaire 
1. A group interview 
2. survey 
questionnaire with 
complementary 
questions 
Intention to 
study this 
focus group 
To understand how 
recently returned 
perceive 
homecoming and 
how they intend to 
develop veterans' 
support system 
(including post-
operational training) 
for veterans. 
To understand how 
peer support 
volunteers/experts 
perceive 
peacekeepers' 
homecoming and 
need for support and 
training 
To understand the 
specific needs of 
peacekeeping 
veterans with 
disability in terms of 
psychosocial support. 
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All the interviewees had personal experience from peacekeeping work as well as from 
returning home from peacekeeping missions. By interviewing the three different 
focus groups it is possible to get complementary information about peacekeepers’ 
thinking after homecoming. The recently returned peacekeepers can memorize their 
recent experiences of homecoming and describe how they assess the needs to develop 
both training and psychosocial support of the peacekeepers. 
Because the focus groups have different experiences, the idea of the study was to get 
different focus groups’ perspectives included when intending to assess the further 
needs to develop psychosocial support for the returnees. Both questions related to 
health care and social services as well as peer support were handled in research 
interviews.  
Even though these ideas are embedded especially in Finnish peacekeeping legislation 
and voluntary peer support activities, that are mostly carried out by the Finnish 
Peacekeepers Association. The interviewees’ documented views, how they perceive 
the changes related to coming home from a mission, may provide relevant 
information for considering, what kind of long-term impact various missions may 
have on the lives of peacekeeping veterans. 
All three focus groups of peacekeeping veterans were interviewed about their views, 
how to develop support to former peacekeepers after homecoming. Recently returned 
veterans were also interviewed in detail about their experiences after homecoming. 
The recently returned peacekeepers were interviewed between January and August 
2018 and filled in a questionnaire consisting of complementary questions in Autumn 
2018. The telephone support volunteers filled in a survey and group of them attended 
a group interview in May 2018. The disabled reservist peacekeepers attended a group 
interview in June 2018. The interview technique in use was focused or half-structured 
interviewing. 
The study is largely based of using qualitative interviews. The interviews of the 
recently returned peacekeepers were focused or half-structured interviews. 
Understanding different ways of thinking about homecoming and the best forms to 
psychosocial support among the interviewees is at the focus of this study. Qualitative 
research is interpretive, because it is used for interpreting symbolic material, different 
interpretations can be valid and because it focuses on research questions, which 
explore personal or social meanings (Schreier, 2012, p. 21).  
A letter from the future was a voluntary exercise for the recently returned 
peacekeepers to do between the two interviews. They were asked to write “a letter 
from the future” and to imagine to be in the future so that ten years would have 
passed since coming home peacekeeping duties. This kind of technique applies a 
solution-focused procedure to strengthen an individual’s perspectives on the future, 
today and the past (Isebaert, 2017, p. 132). 
The interpretation of the interviews and small-scale survey material is at the centre of 
this study. However, due to the limited sizes of the samples, the results are interpreted 
as views of the interviewees, and further research is needed to see whether the results 
from this study are generalizable.  
Because three focus groups of peacekeepers are represented in this research, it is 
valuable to assess how much the results in these groups have resemblance. Therefore, 
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the use of three different focus groups plays a role of partial methodological 
triangulation. Methodological triangulation means using “the same method on 
different occasions or different methods on the same object of study” (see Cohen et 
al., 2007, p. 142). In this research, triangulation means gathering material focusing on 
different focus groups with slightly different methods and the analysis of the results 
from different focus groups to see how similar the results are. This kind of 
triangulation is to strengthen the reliability of the analysis.  
5.3 Results by the Focus Groups and their Comparison 
The main results are presented mostly by focus groups in this chapter, and some 
comparison of the results is made at the end of the chapter.    
Recently returned peacekeepers 
The average age of the interviewees was 37 years. Two of the interviewees were 
women and eleven were men. These interviewees had served in 2.7 operations on 
average, and four of the interviewees had experience of only one operation. A 
majority of the interviewees had served for UNIFIL in Lebanon at least once.  
Social and economic aspects 
Many of the recently returned peacekeepers reported that soon after homecoming, it 
was easier for them to communicate about the issues related to the past operation with some 
comrades from the same operation. Many of the recently returned peacekeepers identified 
themselves with the comrades who had served for the same operation as they. Peer 
support from the comrades of the same operation was often preferred soon after 
returning home. Some of the returnees assessed that it was difficult for them “to be 
present” at home soon after returning. Strengthening one’s ability to talk about passed 
peacekeeping experiences was recommended by the interviewees in all the focus 
groups. This difficulty to be present is related to both social and psychological action 
competence. 
Another important aspect of social questions is employment. Some interviewees 
emphasized that homecoming had been more challenging to them, when they had 
not had any work where to go, or they could not study either. These interviewees 
described that they had experienced a clear difference between homecomings when 
employed and when not. The problem of peacekeepers’ potential unemployment 
mostly exists, when peacekeepers do not continue to work for the defence forces but 
are rather recruited from the reserves. Therefore, the social impact of post-operational 
unemployment is a problem, which requires attention in the countries like Finland, 
where a large number of reservists are deployed to military crisis management duties. 
Finding meaning 
Personal processes of thinking about the meaning of the operation may be central to 
both peacekeepers who are deployed or who have returned from an operation. As 
one interviewee described, the peacekeeping experience had an impact on his world 
view (1), and another expressed (6) that he had had difficulties to get motivated at 
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work after coming back home because he had felt that his previous operational duties 
had been apparently more important than his duties at work after returning home.   
For an interviewee, who had had difficulties to describe his duties and their 
significance to his personal contacts, the lack of respect on their behalf had been 
problematic, when searching for the meaning of his duties in Afghanistan (9).  
Four of the interviewees found “a letter from the future” exercise very useful and 
recommendable to other peacekeepers. One interviewee believed that the exercise 
would be fruitful especially for those peacekeepers, who have not been able to go 
through the experiences from the operations prior to the exercise. 
Physical and psychological aspects of stress  
Returning home from an operation sometimes means a significant reduction of stress. 
If the operation has caused stress, both psychological and physical to reduce stress 
are important. Three of the interviewees (2, 6, 8) underlined that it is important to 
take a sufficiently long vacation after returning home. Two veterans from Afghanistan 
mentioned that they still tend to keep their backs towards the wall in outer spaces due 
to their experiences of risk reduction outdoors during their duties in Afghanistan. 
Change management and support after homecoming 
The change management of the recently returned peacekeepers was assessed with 
scaling questions. With a scale of 1-10, the interviewees were asked to assess their 
level of change management immediately after homecoming and at the time of the 
interview. The best level of the change management in the scale was 10 and the lowest 
level was 1. The change management level of the recently returned peacekeepers was 
estimated simply by asking the interviewees about their personal assessment of the 
level of the change management. Immediately after homecoming the change 
management level of the respondent had been on average 7.2, when assessed in the 
first interview, and at the time of the first interviews it was 8.7. Some of the 
interviewees had felt that their feeling of change management lowered soon after 
homecoming, even though the level later came higher. However, even though this 
scaling question on change management is not a standard scale, the result can be 
interpreted both as a positive sign concerning the evolvement of change management 
after returning home and as encouraging feedback to follow veterans’ personal views 
about change management.  
Three of the interviewees (7, 10, 12) compared their experiences of homecoming after 
different operations and concluded, that it was much more difficult to return, if you 
had no working place or a place, where to start to study. This topic makes a clear 
difference between the peacekeepers who are recruited from the reserves and who 
are career soldiers, because career soldiers do not usually need to think about further 
c.  
How to develop training procedures after homecoming  
Recently returned peacekeepers had slightly controversial views on how to develop 
the training procedure after homecoming. The interviewees underlined that the post-
operational training 1-2 months after homecoming had mostly been successful and 
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that this type of training procedure could be developed further. There were both 
supporting and opposing views in terms of developing a second training after 
returning home from military crisis management duties. Nowadays, recently returned 
peacekeepers participate a training approximately two months after returning home 
from a mission. Due to this contradiction, a complementary survey questionnaire was 
sent to the participants of this focus group.  
11 out of 13 interviewees filled in the complementary survey questionnaire. Nine out 
eleven respondents were in favour of arranging a second (mandatory) post-
operational training approximately one year after homecoming. On the other hand, 
two respondents opposed this type of event for the returnees, and the other one of 
those two believed that a post-operational training would not be a preferable form of 
providing psychosocial support for the individuals, who might need it.  
Family support 
Due to the interview discussion favouring the idea of strengthening support to the 
families and the close individuals, some questions of the questionnaire focused on 
what kind of support would be beneficial for family members and also for the 
interaction in families. Information booklets for family members and close relatives 
to make the post-operational change management of the peacekeepers more 
understandable, was one of the ideas that received unanimous support from the 
respondents. 
As one interviewee (8) described, the interaction between a peacekeeper and his/her 
family change over the time of the deployment. The realities before the deployment, 
during it, during the vacation and after the deployment are different for the 
peacekeeper and his or her family members, which affects familial interaction. It is 
noteworthy that realities and “timelines” of a peacekeeper and the family transform 
through such processes, which may deteriorate familial interaction and 
communication. On the other hand, understanding these differences in the realities 
and their interpretation may improve familial communication.  
Coping with challenges 
Even though the interviewees could describe their personal challenges after 
homecoming, it did not necessarily mean that they would have been going through a 
personal crisis. Some of the interviewees had experience of consultations with 
professionals of psychosocial support. Three of the interviewees reported such 
consultations after earlier deployments, one after the latest one and one during the 
latest operation. However, some of the interviewees also intended to provide support 
to other returnees from peacekeeping duties and, of them, two had received 
professional psychosocial support at some earlier time. This finding may emphasize 
the fact that challenges of change management or some other mental challenges after 
homecoming do not necessarily mean that these persons would have constant 
problems in their mental health.  
On the contrary, change management as a concept provides opportunities to 
understand how a temporary phase in an individual’s life span may have impact on 
his or her mental health, but that with adequate support, it is also possible that a 
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recovery takes place and that these individuals are capable to provide peer support on 
their behalf. 
Long-term support and reflecting action competence 
Some of the interviewees underlined that the significance of the long-term support 
after the operation to the deployed personnel in order to prevent problems in mental 
health during and after operations. Both female interviewees were in favour of the 
idea, that peacekeeping operations should provide services of psychologists to the 
deployed peacekeepers. This type of services would facilitate the communications of 
the peacekeeping communities, which may not favour communicating about personal 
challenges as well as change management after homecoming due to their military 
culture.  
Social and psychological action competence are central for change management and 
dealing with the experiences after homecoming from a peace operation, for example 
in relation to keeping contacts with previous comrades from an operation or being 
able to be present and communicate at home. However, also ethical and psychological 
action competence are relevant for finding meaning for a mission, and physical and 
psychological action competence in terms of relaxation. On the other hand, change 
management is related to an individual and his or her psychological capacity to work 
on various changes. 
Telephone support hotline 
According to telephone support hotline volunteers’ responses to the survey 
questionnaire, sometimes individuals who call to the hotline are individuals who are 
in a deep crisis in their lives. In the group interview, the expert of the peer support 
described, that individuals who typically call to the hotline are either peacekeeping 
reservists, who have returned to Finland more than five years prior to taking a contact 
to this service, or family members, who are worried about the current situation with 
their spouses or other family members, whose are serving or have served as 
peacekeepers.  
According to the survey, the most common reason to call to hotline was assessed to 
be “a difficulty to communicate”. Topics that had often been discussed were also 
money, alcohol, insomnia, mental health, adaptation difficulties, fear, question related 
couple relations, chaotic everyday life and suicidal aspects. If a difficulty to 
communicate remains as a problem for at least some of those peacekeeping veterans, 
who have returned home more than five years ago, it means that there is a group of 
peacekeeping veterans who may benefit from some other psychosocial services than 
telephone support hotline to alleviate their problems. However, the number of 
individuals who belong to this group cannot be assessed to the methodology of this 
study.   
The experts of telephone support assessed that post-operational training and support 
to the returnees can be developed to better respond to the needs of the returnees. A 
conclusion of the group interview is that returned peacekeepers may need new forms 
of support. One potential idea would be a peer-support based chat service to the 
peacekeepers and their families. This expert group was also in favour of the idea that 
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those individuals who have served in challenging operations would have one or two 
consultations with an expert of psychosocial support after homecoming. There would 
also be a need to develop special support for those individuals who have ceased their 
peacekeeping service. The results on psychosocial support from this focus group also 
mainly focused on social and to a certain extent on psychological action competence.    
According to the experts of the telephone support hotline, peacekeeping experiences 
may have a dual meaning. On the other hand, it may be a burden even years after the 
experience, and on the other hand, it may also function as a source of resources and 
positive memories, and therefore some peacekeeping veterans may call to this hotline, 
when they face a new personal crisis, because they believe that peer support from a 
member of a peacekeeping community is reliable.  
Disabled peacekeepers 
The interviewed group of four disabled peacekeepers participated in a rehabilitation 
course for disabled peacekeeping veterans. All of them had gone through major 
changes in their lives due to becoming disabled either by severe physical injuries or 
psychological symptoms.  
Cooperation improve the situation of veterans with disabilities was important for this 
focus group. They reported that had they identified themselves to other veterans in 
the same group, not as much to the veterans who had served in the same operation 
as they had. Peer support is especially important for the veterans in this group and 
peer support may also make it easier to seek professional psychosocial support to 
work on one’s thoughts and emotions.   
The interviewees also described that they had actively cooperated to improve the 
legislation concerning disabled peacekeeping veterans. Active and altruistic work for 
supporting other veterans with disabilities appeared to be an important part of their 
lives. 
Change management and long-term adaptation are also central processes for disabled 
peacekeepers. For both those having had severe mental problems after homecoming 
or having become physically disabled, change management and long-term adaption 
require attention. Disabled peacekeepers were in favour of the idea that all the 
returnees would participate in a second post-operational training approximately one 
year after homecoming.  
Family support is an important issue for those veterans who have become disabled 
or got mental health problems due to their service in military crisis management. The 
interviewees´ families had not necessarily received any other official support than one 
telephone call from their service place after the incident, which had led to the 
disability. As one interviewee described the process: “No other support besides the 
one and only phone call, was provided!” The family members would need a support 
person at least for a year after they have received the information on a peacekeepers’ 
disability, as one interviewee suggested. The procedures how to support the families 
of disabled peacekeeping veterans need to be clarified in order to alleviate the lives of  
these families who face extreme challenges in a completely new situation. 
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According to the interviewees, the information material provided to the families of 
all the peacekeepers should also include a kind of list of potential more severe 
symptoms of mental health problems. This kind of list would help the family 
members of peacekeeping veterans to react, when needed and to communicate with 
the veteran about the potential need to seek psychosocial support.  
Regarding action competence, the focus in this group discussion was on all aspects of 
action competence, especially on social and psychological action competence. The 
participants of the group discussion also emphasized that professionals in the 
professions in health and psychosocial support services should get further instruction 
and training concerning the potential impacts of peacekeeping duties for an 
individual. Nowadays, according to the participants, many professionals may not 
check this issue when working with the clients of health services.   
Emerging themes in all the focus groups 
The need to improve the follow-up of returning peacekeepers was emphasized by the 
representatives of all the focus groups of the study. For the recently returned 
peacekeepers, change management was a process, which they could describe. On the 
other hand, the experts from the telephone support hotline emphasized that besides 
that many reservists, who had returned more than five years ago contacted the hotline 
service in order to get psychosocial peer support. Therefore, there seem to be both 
shorter term change management and long-term adaptation, which occur as 
peacekeepers’ internal processes after homecoming. 
Peacekeepers who have interrupted the operation should have a special follow-up, 
because they may need some further support after the operation (an idea from the 
telephone support hotline). Both peer support and professional psychosocial support 
should be provided to the returnees. They are options, which are used by individuals 
in different situations.  
The theme of supporting families emerged from all the focus groups. Especially many 
recently returned peacekeepers emphasized the idea. For the disabled peacekeepers, 
this theme was important because lack of support to their families had been a notable 
problem, when their families had received the first calls about the accident/incident 
from the armed forces.  
A better understanding of the potential psychological impacts of the peace operation 
could facilitate the wellbeing of the families and peacekeepers and their 
communication. 
There are similarities and differences between the groups in terms of the priorities 
how to develop training of the peacekeepers and relevant services facilitation post-
operational change management. The most relevant findings of the article are 
introduced by focus groups in Table 2.   
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Table 2. Comparison of the results in different focus groups and the implications for 
training, education and follow-up 
 
Recently returned 
peacekeepers 
Volunteers in the telephone 
support hotline  
Disabled peacekeeping 
veterans 
Peer support 
identification 
The identification 
especially to the comrades 
from the same operation. 
The telephone support hotline 
is based on peer support. The 
identification of peacekeepers 
tends to change over time. 
Usually the peacekeepers first 
identify themselves with their 
operational service comrades. 
Disabled peacekeeping 
veterans identify to the 
commerades in the same 
position. 
Change management 
and longterm 
adaptation 
The change management 
usually improves gradually, 
or there may be a kind of 
collapse soon after 
homecoming. 
Long-term adaptation may 
differ from the change 
management soon after 
homecoming.  
PTSD symptoms may come 
later, which is important for 
understanding the dynamics of 
the homecoming. 
Family support 
A booklet for the families 
needed: the focus should 
be on the psychology of 
the operations. Broader 
opportunities for the 
families to get information 
concerning the operation 
and the psychology of 
peacekeeping.  
Family members take contact 
to telephone support hotline 
during and soon after the 
operation. 
Family members of all the 
peacekeepers need 
information on potential 
severe symptoms due to the 
operations. For the families of 
the peacekeepers, who have 
become disabled or got mental 
illness due to the operation, it 
would be reasonable to 
arrange follow-up and support 
by a support person. The 
follow-up should continue for 
at least a year. 
Implications for 
training and follow-
up 
A second training for the 
returned peacekeepers. It is 
necessary to develop 
follow-up mechanisms for 
the recently returned 
peacekeepers. 
A special consultation for the 
returned peacekeepers in 
specific risk groups (those who 
have interrupted or served in a 
riskier operation or face 
potentially traumatizing 
events). 
A second training for the 
returned peacekeepers. 
Specified follow-up for the 
families of the disabled 
peacekeepers. 
 
Strengthening psychosocial support to the returnees was a common theme regarding 
all the focus groups. For example, some interviewees representing recently returned 
peacekeepers underlined that further psychosocial support would be needed also 
during the operation, and two of them proposed that there should be a psychologist 
consulting every peacekeeping operation.  
On the other hand, the disabled peacekeeping veterans underlined, that in the basic 
and applied education and training of health care personnel, issues related to 
peacekeeping operations and their potential impact on peacekeepers should be dealt 
with. 
Peacekeepers may feel strong solidarity with their comrades. This solidarity or a strong 
will to support one’s comrades was found in the interviews of all the focus groups. It 
reflects altruism, which can be interpreted in the context of posttraumatic growth. 
Even though not all the interviewees had faced traumatic experiences, they had gone 
through a life-changing experience of being a peacekeeper. The consequences of 
emerging solidarity or altruism for comrades may be similar to posttraumatic growth. 
Work for helping the comrades in the same situation in and after a peacekeeping 
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operation can be interpreted as a will to be altruistic due to these life-changing 
experiences, though they may not have been traumatizing. 
In terms of action competence, the results mostly focus on social action competence, 
which is also dependent on the fact that social contexts were emphasized in the 
interviews. However, the processing of homecoming is a psychological process. Some 
of the recently returned peacekeepers also pointed out the physical aspects of 
homecoming, and some of them also emphasized the ethical action competence by 
underlining the significance of the operation.  
The conclusion from the results is that questions related change management and 
long-term adaptation can be categorized mostly to be part of social and psychological 
action competence. This conclusion is necessary to mention to better understand 
what kinds of implications the results do have in terms of the education and training 
of soldiers and peacekeepers.  
5.4 Discussion  
The relevance of the results concerning change management and homecoming can 
also be assessed in the context of the training of peacekeepers and the education of 
soldiers and officers. Psychological resilience, change management and long-term 
adaptation deserve strengthening in the curricula of military education and 
peacekeepers’ training.  
Psychological resilience is its nature a psychological concept, and many aspects of 
action competence contribute to it. It is necessary to analyse how these aspects raised 
from the results from the empirical analysis of this study and what kinds of impact 
these results have in terms of developing military training and education and further 
research. As Southwick and Charney (2018) describe, psychological resilience is based 
on a multitude of factors, which are not only psychological. Therefore, resilience 
training requires versatility and knowledge on the basis of resilience. 
Operational support and training for personal resilience and change management can 
be interpreted as part of institutional learning to deal with complex operational 
environments and their impact on the deployed personnel. Increasing cooperation of 
peacekeeping training centres and intensifying use of e-learning based methods 
provide new opportunities for teaching and training of peacekeepers (Curran, 2013, 
pp. 91–92). Therefore, international co-operation can be a vital part of developing 
training and education on resilience, change management and long-term adaptation 
after homecoming.  
Reservists were largely on the focus of this research, in particular, when concerning 
the recently returned peacekeepers. It is necessary to underline that the context of 
professional soldiers may be slightly different especially when analysing 
unemployment issues and their impact after homecoming, because professional 
soldiers mostly continue to work in military duties after homecoming. However, the 
results can be applied to military education and training. Comparison of the results in 
different focus groups is a kind of methodological triangulation, which makes the 
results more reliable. 
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As it was concluded in the previous chapter, questions related change management 
and long-term adaptation after homecoming mostly focus on social and psychological 
action competence and relate to psychological resilience. Therefore, education and 
training focusing on these themes can be combined with the curricula on social and 
psychological action competence. However, ethical and physical action competence 
are also relevant for understanding change management and long-term adaptation. 
Framework for homecoming and long-term adaptation after homecoming  
The results of this study help us think about peacekeepers experiences after 
homecoming and how we could consider peacekeeping veterans’ homecoming and 
their change management and long-term adaptation processes.  
Psychosocial adaptation to one’s disability or illness has been studied for decades 
(Järvikoski & Härkäpää, 2014). But what should we think about change management 
and long-term adaptation to an individual’s personal life after homecoming from a 
peacekeeping operation? Definitely, this type of change management and long-term 
adaptation cannot be considered as a similar phenomenon as adapting to any disability 
or illness. 
What are the prerequisites for change management after homecoming from a 
peacekeeping operation? At least, the ability to communicate about one’s passed 
peacekeeping experiences and his or her feelings after homecoming appear important. 
Peer support and familial support alleviate potential challenges. This is consistent with 
Greenberg et al.’s (2003) findings, according to which speaking about passed 
experiences is beneficial for peacekeepers and informal networks including peers and 
families are of importance for getting support. 
 
Figure 1. Change management, long-term adaptation and symptomatic reactions 
after homecoming from a peacekeeping operation 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between change management and long-term 
adaptation. It is, of course, possible that PTSD may emerge during a deployment or 
in the midst of long-term adaptation, even though it usually emerges in six months 
after traumatizing events or experiences of major negative affection (Finnish Institute 
for Health, 2012, p.180). PTSD may emerge also during the operation. 
Change management, which is a shorter-term process after homecoming seem to be 
improving among recently returned peacekeepers. But as the experts from the 
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telephone support hotline described, mostly those taking contact to the hotline have 
challenges in their lives even though they had mostly returned beck home several 
years prior to calling to this service.  
There are reasons to believe that change management soon after homecoming and 
long-term adaptation later after homecoming are slightly different kinds of processes. 
Both of them may include positive psychological changes, which resemble 
posttraumatic growth, even though the involved peacekeepers may not have faced 
potentially traumatizing events during his or her crisis management duties. This 
phenomenon may be called as internal post-operational growth. It is noticeable that 
many veteran peacekeepers collaborate to help their former comrades and express 
this type of altruistic behaviour. In this study, many of the representatives from all 
the focus groups told about their activities to support their former comrades and 
other veteran peacekeepers. Naturally, this type of behaviour was part of the selection 
criteria to the focus group of “the experts of telephone support hotline”. But in the 
other two focus groups, there were no selection criteria according to which it would 
have mandatory for the participants of the interviews to carry out altruistic behaviour.   
If we relate Figure 1. to the focus groups’ views related to peacekeepers or veterans’ 
various needs for psychosocial support, it is clear that adequate professional and peer 
support can play a crucial role in the prevention of severe symptoms. Therefore, it is 
important that both types of psychosocial support are provided - and strengthened - 
in order both to prevent and potentially also cure severe psychological symptoms. On 
the other hand, for getting confirmation of the model as well as deeper understanding 
on this distinction, it would be valuable to study more the period after veterans’ 
homecoming as well as, how much change management and long-term adaption 
differ from each other to get confirmation about this distinction. 
However, veterans, who have returned from a military crisis management operation, 
do not necessarily need any special form of professional psychosocial or peer support. 
But we have to keep in mind the option that they may need training and support to 
find themselves rather in the process of posttraumatic growth instead of PTSD. This 
aspect is relevant for military education and training as well as for the training for 
health professionals. Regarding military training and education, it is important that 
the dynamics after homecoming from a military crisis management operation would 
be handled as a topic, which requires elaboration. 
Because peacekeeping veterans with disabilities and rehabilitation needs have not 
been studied thoroughly, it would also be important to study this group in order to 
get a more detailed understanding how to develop a comprehensive approach to their 
needs for service, also including the services to their families and close relations. 
Military training for peacekeeping and military crisis management: a proposal 
for a development and research project 
The results provide support to the idea of a second post-operational training to be 
arranged approximately one year after homecoming. It would be a method to 
strengthen returning peacekeepers’ overall capacity to handle change management 
after homecoming. However, the recently returned peacekeepers did not support this 
idea unanimously and the focus group of the experts on telephone support hotline 
were in favour of a selection of the risk groups and specified service production for 
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them. One option would be to study the idea introduced above within a Pilot Project, 
which would be studied within a research procedure with some comparison group.  
If the suggested procedure to study a second post-operational training is carried out, 
it will be possible to get research results and information about returned peacekeepers’ 
perceptions on the training and assess its positive impact in relation to the investments 
(money, use of time etc.) and to the alternative ways to provide education and support 
to the returned peacekeepers. 
In the same study, it would also be possible to study some other ideas which were 
developed within the interviews and surveys for this study. It might be possible to 
compare the procedures of a second training after one year from homecoming and 
questionnaire surveys or telephone interviews of the returnees or a combination of 
survey questionnaires and telephone interviewees of the returnees. It may be possible, 
that the selection to different focus groups of the study could be conducted 
consistently with the risks of the operations.   
Military education 
Understanding change management and long-term adaptation as relevant processes 
for returning peacekeepers is a theme, which may need to be strengthened in military 
education. When assessing the level of military education, at which this theme should 
be handled, it is important to take into account that in Finland, a large proportion of 
peacekeepers are deployed from the reserves. The results of this study focus more on 
reservist peacekeepers. Therefore, some instruction on this theme would also be 
adequate in the basic education of soldiers.  
At different levels of education for career soldiers and officers, the theme is extremely 
important. It is also necessary to provide information on the potential differences 
between career soldiers and reservists in relation to challenges after homecoming. 
Consistently with the results described in this article, special attention to the 
employment of the returning reservists may be needed also when teaching, what kind 
of differences are relevant between deployed reservists and career soldiers. In the 
Finnish context, change management and long-term adaptation could be handled in 
the courses of military pedagogy with the focus on international crisis management 
and peacekeeping operations.  
As a scientific discipline, military pedagogy needs to be critical to the education and 
training of the military (Toiskallio, 2017). In this context being analytical is important. 
In depth analysis also includes the idea of responsibility to teach and educate military 
personnel to act with responsibility and to support getting clarifications for 
understanding the meaning of the operation, which is also important for enhancing 
resilience among soldiers. 
Differences of the timelines after homecoming and familial support 
Understanding the differences in a returnee’s timeline may facilitate to arrange 
relevant training for the returnees and also for those, who provide services for the 
returnees and their families. For all the persons involved, it is important to understand 
inner processes of peacekeepers before, during and after operations. If change 
management and long-term adaptation are seen at least partly different kinds of 
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processes, it they require slightly different training. Change management takes place 
soon after homecoming, and long-term adaptation may be a lifelong long-term 
process. Lifelong training arrangements for the returnees may also be required, if they 
are necessary for long-term adaptation.  
With these results it is impossible to know, how many peacekeepers would need 
further training also for their long-term adaptation. Is long-term adaptation a suitable 
term concerning all the returnees or only a limited group of them? It may be difficult 
to assess this question and find precise research methods for the assessment. 
However, at least a long-term follow-up procedure concerning the need for 
psychosocial support could be a way to get more information on this topic.   
Peacekeepers’ families may need further information on the psychological impacts of 
the operations, and this material should also include a check-list for potential more 
severe impacts of an operation on a returning veteran. The recently returned 
peacekeepers were in favour of the idea of producing material for the families 
especially in terms of the psychological impact. However, as the returned 
peacekeepers in this study have also described the challenges of homecoming as an 
outcome of difficulties with interaction, the communication questions could also be 
seen as a theme to be handled in the material and training for the families in order to 
facilitate communication within the families of returned peacekeepers. Because 
interaction within a family or a couple may be problematic, more practical tools for 
dealing with the challenges of interaction and the ways how to improve the 
communication may also be needed. 
It is important that special support is provided to the families of those peacekeepers 
who have become disabled due to the peace operation. A support person who could 
have a contact to the family for at least one year was a practical idea expressed by one 
interviewee for this study. Guidelines for persons who provide the information on a 
peacekeeper’s wounding would also be needed, and broader guidelines related to 
policies to support a wounded peacekeeper’s family and close relations might also be 
needed. In my view, a research project for studying veteran peacekeepers’ families 
and their adaptation is also recommended. 
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